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INTRODUCTION 
Originalism is ascendant. Consider District of Columbia v. Heller,1 in which the 
Supreme Court, confronting the Second Amendment “right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms,”2 invalidated the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the 
possession of handguns in light of “the original understanding of the Second 
Amendment.”3 The relevant “understanding,” the Court added, was that of the 
framing-era public:  
“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its 
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.” Normal meaning may of course 
include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the 
founding generation.4 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2012 Lawrence Rosenthal. 
 *  Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. Many thanks are owed to 
Isa Lang and the staff of Chapman University School of Law’s Rinker Law Library for 
highly capable research assistance. I am deeply grateful to Jack Balkin, Saul Cornell, 
Richard Kay, Donald Kochan, Ron Rotunda, George Thomas, and Adam Winkler for their 
enormously helpful comments on prior drafts. They did their best to set me straight; any 
errors that remain are entirely my own. 
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 4. Id. at 576–77 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)) (citation 
omitted). 
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This, of course, is originalism, which “regards the discoverable meaning of the 
Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of 
constitutional interpretation in the present.”5 Notably, in Heller, the Court’s 
originalism was not based on the intentions of the Constitution’s framers—an 
approach that has been criticized as unacceptably indeterminate and inconsistent 
with the framing-era understandings about how legal texts should be interpreted6—
but instead was based on the original meaning of constitutional text as understood 
by the framing-era public.7 In this embrace of original meaning, Heller was no 
sport; in recent years, for example, the Court has used originalism to revolutionize 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 
(2004). Although this definition will suffice for present purposes, Lawrence Solum has 
provided a helpful elaboration: 
[M]ost or almost all originalists agree that original meaning was fixed or 
determined at the time each provision of the constitution was framed and 
ratified. We might call this idea the fixation thesis. It is no surprise that 
originalists agree on the fixation thesis. The term “originalism” was coined to 
describe a family of textualist and intentionalist approaches to constitutional 
interpretation and construction that were associated with phrases like “original 
intentions,” “original meaning,” and “original understanding.” These phrases 
and the word “originalist” share the root word “origin.” The idea that meaning 
is fixed at the time of origination for each constitutional provision serves as the 
common denominator for all of these expressions. Thus, the fixation thesis 
might be described as a core idea around which all or almost all originalist 
theories organize themselves.  
Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) [hereafter THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM] (emphasis in original). 
 6. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 
284–398 (1988); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340–65 (1996); Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in 
Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456–74 (1984); Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209–22 (1980); Paul Finkelman, 
The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 349, 351–58 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985). For responses to these criticisms from 
advocates of original-intention originalism, see, for example, Larry Alexander, 
Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 87, 89–94; 
Raoul Berger, The Founders’ Views—According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 
1055–76 (1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 236–84 (1988); 
Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 
77 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. 
COMMENT. 43 (1987). 
 7. For a useful typology of the various approaches to originalist constitutional 
interpretation, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 
247–67 (2009). 
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its sentencing jurisprudence, as well as its approach to the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause.8  
Originalism stands in opposition to nonoriginalism, which does not regard 
original meaning as authoritative.9 Perhaps nonoriginalism’s classic exposition 
came from Justice Holmes:  
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like 
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have 
called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough 
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has 
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to 
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered 
in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was 
said a hundred years ago.10 
The emergence of originalism in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence parallels its 
emergence in the academy. In recent decades, originalism has been advocated by a 
growing and diverse group of scholars who, although often taking different 
positions on the particulars of originalist interpretation, agree that the 
Constitution’s status as a written legal text means that constitutional interpretation 
should be governed by the meaning of text as it was understood in the framing 
era.11 One leading scholar has claimed that among academics, originalism has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. For useful discussions of the manner in which originalism has revolutionized the 
Court’s jurisprudence in these areas, see, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, 
Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044–64, 
1068–69 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The 
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 
189–99 (2005); John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really 
Move Left Because of Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1476–81 
(2006); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of 
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 217, 231–32 (2010); and Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 
871–72 (2008). 
 9. A typology of nonoriginalism can be derived from Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of 
constitutional argument, which include historical, textual, prudential, ethical, structural, and 
doctrinal argument. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 3–119 (1982). Of these modalities, only the first is originalist. Even historical 
argument, however, does not qualify as originalist under the definition offered above if it is 
based on understandings of constitutional text that emerged after the framing era, as is 
sometimes the case. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737, 1797–1812 (2007); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33–76 (1998); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 
108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2138–41 (1999). 
 10. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).  
 11. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35–37 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92–117 (2004); 
GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 
67–90 (1992); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 28–
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become “the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation.”12 As a normative 
matter, originalism is said to offer three primary virtues. First, it is said to 
appropriately constrain the judiciary by confining it to the interpretation of legal 
text.13 Second, it is thought to reflect the proper role of the judiciary in a republican 
form of government by treating as binding the judgments made by the framers and 
ratifiers when adopting constitutional text.14 Third, originalism is said to lead to 
                                                                                                                 
53 (1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 160–212 (1999); Hans W. Baade, “Original 
Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1103–07 
(1991); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal 
Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–259 
(1987); Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 751, 756–60 (1987); Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: 
Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textual Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1607, 1641–67 (2009); Kay, supra note 6, at 229–36; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 
1113, 1127–48 (2003); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial 
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–87 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the 
Constitution (and How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056–62 (2006); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541–45 (1998) 
(reviewing RAKOVE, supra note 6); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the 
Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Lawrence B. 
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940–55 
(2009).  
 12. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 
(1999). For accounts of the turn toward originalism among legal scholars see, for example, 
DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 
20–154 (2005); and JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101–216 (2005).  
 13. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 11, at 100–09; PERRY, supra note 11, at 31–38; 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 50–61; Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality 
of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 288–91 (1996); Lino A. Graglia, 
“Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020–29 (1992); 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); Steven D. 
Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 105–06 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, We 
Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38–42 (Robert W. 
Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM]. 
 14. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 54-56; ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–60 (1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note 
11, at 152–59; Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1119, 1121–26 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse 
Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440, 1444–46 (2007); Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism 
as an “Ism”, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 307–08 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, 
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132–37 (1998); 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION]; Solum, supra note 13, at 42–44.  
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desirable outcomes by protecting legal commitments that reflect fundamental 
values.15 
To be sure, originalism has its critics, who deny that originalism follows from 
the character of the Constitution as a written text,16 or vindicates popular 
sovereignty within republican government.17 The critics also claim that originalism 
is not required or even able to impose adequate constraint on the judiciary given the 
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and the rigor of many nonoriginalist 
approaches.18 The critics add that originalism enshrines framing-era understandings 
even when they come to be regarded as outmoded or unjust.19  
The scholarly debate over originalism often seems abstract. Supporters and 
opponents debate the theoretical merits of originalism, but rarely test their views on 
the merits of originalism by reference to the realities of constitutional adjudication. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82–88 
(2009); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1698–733 (2010). 
 16. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 115–18 (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY 
THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 20–32 (2009); Mitchell 
N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 38–68 (2009); Andrew B. Coan, The 
Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025 (2010); 
Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 282–87; Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: 
“Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 25–53 (2009). 
 17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 32–39 
(2001); Berman, supra note 16, at 69–75; Brest, supra note 6, at 225–29; Coan, supra note 
16, at 853–57; Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 388–91 (1997); 
Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 187–
202 (2008); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can 
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1499–501 (1985); Smith, 
supra note 16, at 13–24; Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. 
397, 448–56 (2009–10); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 928–34 (1996). 
 18. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 76–
78 (2010); BREYER, supra note 16, at 118–27; DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS 11–21 (2002); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18–21 (2010); 
Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 13, at 78, 87–114; Berman, supra note 16, at 75–77, 88–93; Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 43, 92–103 (1989); Coan, supra note 16, at 1047–70; Colby & Smith, supra 
note 7, at 288–305; Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 907, 911–13 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the 
Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005); Suzanna Sherry, 
The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437, 440–41 (1996). 
 19. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 18, at 78–79; STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 12–18; 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 69–92; Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public 
Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 1019–32 (2009); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of 
Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358–61 (2007); Adam M. Samaha, 
Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1331–49 (2008). 
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In science, a theory gains acceptance if it makes testable predictions that are later 
borne out.20 Perhaps we cannot expect the precision of science from legal theory, 
but surely we ought to expect something like it.21 Whatever its theoretical merit, 
originalism deserves recognition as a genuinely distinctive and useful approach to 
constitutional adjudication only if, in practice, it provides a genuinely originalist 
vehicle for deciding real cases—that is, by reference to the meaning of 
constitutional text as historically fixed at the time of framing and ratification—
when nonoriginalists would decide them otherwise. Yet the scholarly literature to 
date makes no effort to address that question. This Article aims to fill this gap by 
assessing how originalist interpretations of the Constitution fare in practice.22  
To the extent that originalism demands that constitutional text be treated as 
binding, there is no real difference between originalism and nonoriginalism. 
Nonoriginalists rarely if ever contend the language of the Constitution can be 
ignored when it is inconsistent with contemporary sensibilities; to the contrary, 
they readily acknowledge that constitutional text is binding and that constitutional 
adjudication is properly concerned with interpreting rather than remaking the 
Constitution’s text, even if text is afforded evolving content to maintain its 
relevance to contemporary circumstances.23 Accordingly, nonoriginalist 
constitutional adjudication reflects the primacy of constitutional text. When 
embracing on nonoriginalist grounds the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause forbids apportioning state legislative districts on any basis 
other than population, for example, the Supreme Court never suggested that the 
Constitution’s allocation of two senators to each state can somehow be ignored as 
inconsistent with the current understanding of the constitutional mandate of equal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).  
 21. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 
75 DENV. U. L. REV. 661, 668 (1998) (“In most fields, a theory has to be testable; it is a 
hypothesis, a prediction, and therefore subject to proof. When legal scholars use the word 
‘theory,’ they seem to mean (most of the time) something they consider deep, original, and 
completely untestable.”). 
 22. About the only effort along these lines in the literature to date is a study of the 
Supreme Court’s federalism decisions demonstrating that the use of originalism fails to 
eliminate ideological differences among Members of the Court. See Peter J. Smith, Sources 
of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 217 (2004). 
 23. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 18, at 80–81; EISGRUBER, supra note 17, at 31–32; 
Bennett, supra note 18, at 139–40; Brest, supra note 6, at 228–29, 234–37; Coan, supra note 
16, at 1047–66; Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 
749–55 (2011); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1796–99 (1997); Charles A. 
Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 734–36 (1963); 
Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 
707, 722–24 (2011); Strauss, supra note 17, at 906–23; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 65, 71–73; see also STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S 
QUANDARY 131 (2004) (“[T]he form of judicial activism that appears to enjoy substantial 
support insists that judges interpret the law, not reauthor it; but they should interpret in a 
creative fashion and not be confined to ascertaining the supposed intentions of the 
enactors.”). 
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protection, but instead noted that the Constitution’s text offers no basis for state 
legislatures to be apportioned in the same manner as the United States Senate.24 
The advocates of a “living Constitution” instead make the more limited claim that 
contemporary understandings are of use in interpreting the broadest, most open-
ended provisions in the Constitution.25 For their part, even committed originalists 
acknowledge that the original meaning of constitutional text is sometimes vague or 
ambiguous,26 requiring what they characterize as nonoriginalist construction rather 
than interpretation on the basis of original meaning.27 Thus, whatever its theoretical 
merits, originalism offers a workable and distinctive approach to constitutional 
adjudication only if it provides a vehicle for utilizing the historically fixed meaning 
of constitutional text as a means of reducing the interpretive leeway claimed by 
nonoriginalists. 
The discussion that follows examines whether, in practice, originalism offers a 
method for using the framing-era meaning of constitutional text to reduce the scope 
of textual vagueness and ambiguity that gives rise to nonoriginalist constitutional 
adjudication. Part I explores the efforts of originalists to reduce the scope of textual 
vagueness and ambiguity by relying on framing-era understandings and practices as 
a means of fleshing out the original meaning of constitutional text—what I will call 
“original-expected-applications” originalism. Part II explores “semantic 
originalism,” in which what is regarded as interpretively binding is not the original 
meaning of constitutional text as reflected by its original expected applications, but 
instead the original semantic meaning of constitutional text stated at the level of 
generality found in the text.28 Part III examines the leading ostensibly originalist 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574–77 (1964). 
 25. See, e.g., SOTIROS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 155–70 (2007); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 27–42, 111–18 (2001); GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. 
KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 25–40 
(2010); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 50–58 (2006); STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 7–10, 102–14; 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 8–19 (1991); 
Bennett, supra note 18, at 124–25; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United 
States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 25–32 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an 
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 709–10, 714–17 (1975).  
 26. For present purposes, Professor Solum’s definition of vague or ambiguous text is 
helpful: “Vagueness: A term or phrase is vague if and only if it admits of borderline (or 
uncertain) cases”; and “Ambiguity: A term or phrase is ambiguous in the strict or 
philosophical sense when it has more than one sense or meaning.” Lawrence B. Solum, 
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 415 (2009) 
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).  
 27. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 14, 31–32; BARNETT, supra note 11, at 118–30; 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 5–14; Solum, supra note 26, at 436–42; Grégoire C.N. 
Webber, Originalism’s Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 
147, 173–76. For a more general discussion of the distinction between interpretation and 
construction, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 101–08 (2010). 
 28. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between an originalism based on original 
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decisions of recent years to determine whether originalism, in practice, has proven 
able to make constitutional adjudication turn on historical evidence of the original 
meaning of constitutional text. 
I. ORIGINAL EXPECTED APPLICATIONS 
Perhaps the leading originalist account that denies the possibility of ascribing 
evolving content to constitutional text is original-expected-applications originalism. 
This account does not claim that textual vagueness or ambiguity disappears merely 
by consulting the framing-era meaning of the words used in the Constitution’s text, 
and with reason. Consider, for example, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”29 Two schools of thought have emerged 
about the original meaning of the phrase. One relies on evidence that the term 
“unreasonable,” at least in a legal context, was understood in the framing era as a 
“pejorative synonym for gross illegality or unconstitutionality,”30 while the other 
contends that in the framing era the term meant pretty much what it means today—
“contrary to sound judgment, inappropriate, or excessive.”31 For present purposes, 
it hardly matters which is correct; the original semantic meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment seems little more than a conclusion. Original meaning must be defined 
with greater specificity if it is to provide meaningful guidance to constitutional 
adjudication.32 The kind of vague or ambiguous text that nonoriginalists claim as 
their domain, however, resists such specificity. Original-expected-applications 
                                                                                                                 
expected applications and a semantic form of originalism, which the author labels 
“skyscraper originalism” and “framework originalism,” respectively, see BALKIN, supra note 
11, at 21–34. 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its drafting history sheds little light on the original meaning 
of this phrase. The Amendment began as a single clause forbidding unreasonable search and 
seizure “by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not 
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.” THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223 (Neil H. 
Cogan ed., 1997). The text was changed during debate in the House to create a freestanding 
clause prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure, and in the most complete analysis of the 
limited historical materials, Thomas Davies concluded that the alteration was intended to do 
no more than phrase the prohibition on general warrants in an imperative fashion because of 
the paucity of evidence that anyone intended to make a substantive change to the original 
proposal. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 716–24 (1999). That view may well be correct as a matter of congressional intent, 
but the inference that Professor Davies draws from the legislative history is of little 
significance in determining the original public meaning of the proposal—at least absent 
evidence that the public or at least the ratifiers were aware of a congressional intent to 
preserve the substance of the original proposal in a two-clause format. There is, however, 
virtually no surviving evidence that sheds any light on the understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment in the ratifying states. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 712–23 (2009). 
 30. Davies, supra note 29, at 693. 
 31. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739, 1781 (2000). 
 32. For a helpful discussion of the challenges presented for originalism when 
constitutional text is defined at a high level of generality, see TRIBE & DORF, supra note 25, 
at 31–64. 
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originalism meets this challenge with the claim that textual vagueness and 
ambiguity can be addressed by using framing-era understandings and practices as a 
means of fleshing out the meaning of constitutional text. 
Likely the most prominent contemporary originalist, Justice Scalia professes 
adherence to original-expected-applications originalism. Justice Scalia does not 
claim that the original semantic meaning of constitutional text alone does much to 
reduce the scope of textual vagueness or ambiguity; to the contrary, he 
acknowledges that the Constitution contains much that is “abstract and general 
rather than specific and concrete,”33 but contends that “[t]he context suggests that 
the abstract and general terms, like the concrete and particular ones, are meant to 
nail down current rights, rather than aspire after future ones—that they are abstract 
and general references to extant rights and freedoms possessed under the then-
current regime.”34 Thus, reference to the manner in which rights and freedoms were 
applied in the framing era, we are told, can resolve textual vagueness and 
ambiguity.  
Taking a different route to original-expected-applications originalism, John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have argued that a commitment to originalism 
entails the use of the interpretive devices that were in general acceptance in the 
framing era, including reliance on the generally accepted original understanding of 
a legal text and the drafters’ intentions rather than permitting the kind of 
evolutionary approach favored by nonoriginalists.35 Utilizing this original-methods 
originalism, they argue that the framing generation’s expectations as to the manner 
in which constitutional text would be applied provide powerful evidence of original 
meaning.36 As a means of addressing the difficulties of ascertaining a collective 
intent of the framers or ratifiers and applying it to concrete constitutional debates, 
those who advocate a purposivist brand of originalism, in which textual meaning is 
based on the original intentions underlying constitutional text, similarly find 
framing-era practices and understandings to be an essential means of identifying 
original intentions.37 Despite the differences in these accounts, all utilize the 
framing-era understanding of the text to give content to the open-ended 
constitutional provisions that nonoriginalists claim as their own.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 129, 
135. 
 34. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 35. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 
758–72 (2009). 
 36. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 (2007). Others similarly contend 
that framing-era practices and understandings provide potent evidence of original meaning. 
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 
1654–55 (1997); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519, 525–38 (2003); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172–74 (1996). 
 37. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 6, at 253; Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: 
Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 194–99 
(2010).  
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A. Strong Original-Expected-Applications Originalism 
Original-expected-applications originalism comes in strong and weak forms. 
Strong original-expected-applications originalism treats the framing-era’s 
understanding of the manner in which constitutional text would be applied as 
controlling, while weaker versions permit departures from framing-era 
understandings upon what is regarded as an adequate justification.38 
The classic argument against the strong form of original-expected-applications 
originalism points to Brown v. Board of Education,39 noting that racially segregated 
schools remained common throughout the country even after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore were likely consistent with the framing-era 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 The charge that strong original-
expected-applications originalism cannot justify Brown seems a damning one; as 
Pamela Karlan has written, “because Brown has become the crown jewel of the 
United States Reports, every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself.”41 
Indeed, the response of most originalists to Brown is to condemn reliance on 
original expected applications and argue that racial segregation is inconsistent with 
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s textual commitment to 
equality, even if the framing generation did not yet understand the implications of 
the constitutional text it had ratified.42 
Still, some endeavor to reconcile Brown with original-expected-applications 
originalism. Justice Scalia, for example, believes that the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment condemns all racial discrimination,43 and since, in his view, framing-
era practices and understandings are relevant only to resolve ambiguities in 
constitutional text, they need not be consulted in this instance because the text of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is unambiguous when it 
comes to racial discrimination.44 Yet the clarity of the constitutional command that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. I have borrowed from Mitchell Berman the concept of the “strength” of originalism. 
See Berman, supra note 16, at 10–11. 
 39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 40. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1885–93 (1995). 
 41. Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the 
Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009). 
 42. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 14, at 81–83; PERRY, supra note 11, at 42–44; Lawrence 
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 423–
26 (1995). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 
81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1092–105 (1995) (arguing that Brown can be reconciled with framing-
era understandings by noting that majorities in Reconstruction-era Congresses expressed 
opposition to segregation during consideration of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
though admittedly not the requisite two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution). 
 43. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346–49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 353–54 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 44. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95–96 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Justice Scalia added that support for segregation was not unbroken in the 
framing era since segregation was challenged in some quarters and denounced by Justice 
Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Plessy. See id. This may be so, but it is far from a 
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no “State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws,”45 when applied to the separate-but-equal segregation at issue in Brown, is 
surely open to doubt. As Herbert Wechsler famously wrote in defense of the 
Court’s decision upholding separate-but-equal segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson46: 
“In the context of a charge that segregation with equal facilities is a denial of 
equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if ‘enforced separation 
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority’ it is solely because its members 
choose ‘to put that construction upon it’?”47 Unless Professor Wechsler is regarded 
as having lacked a basic understanding of the English language, something more 
than the unadorned text is required to support Brown.  
But put Brown aside. Justice Scalia has acknowledged that “originalism is 
strong medicine,” and admits, “in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted 
originalist.”48 Perhaps the difficulty of hewing to original expected applications 
when it comes to racial segregation has caused Justice Scalia to flinch. The fact that 
extreme cases may produce a “faint-hearted” originalism, however, need not 
discredit the approach as a general matter. After all, in many other cases, Justice 
Scalia has faithfully relied on framing-era practices and understandings to flesh out 
the original meaning of otherwise vague or ambiguous constitutional text.49 Surely 
the case against original-expected-applications originalism should not be based 
solely on the one example of Brown. 
                                                                                                                 
demonstration that segregation was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s original 
public meaning as reflected in predominant framing-era practice and understandings.  
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 47. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 33 (1959) (emphasis in original) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551). Justice Scalia’s 
position is even more puzzling because when it comes to segregation by sex, he thinks that 
framing-era practice is properly consulted. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568–
70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Equal Protection Clause, however, offers its 
protections to every “person,” without textual reference to either race or sex. It is therefore 
hard to understand how the text could be regarded as unambiguous as to race but ambiguous 
as to sex, requiring reference to framing-era practice for the latter but not the former. 
 48. Scalia, supra note 13, at 863–64. 
 49. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833–36 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (First Amendment Free Speech Clause); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 
843–49 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595–98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Due Process Clause); Board of 
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 687–90 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568–70 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (Equal Protection Clause); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980–
85 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); 
Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–66 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure); Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95–97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause). 
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1. The Incompleteness of Strong Original-Expected-Applications Originalism 
At the outset, we can put aside the objection that evidence of framing-era 
practices and understandings may sometimes be confusing or in conflict. Although 
Justice Scalia himself has acknowledged that it will often be difficult to sort 
through framing-era evidence,50 if an approach to constitutional interpretation is 
acceptable only if it produces no difficult cases, none could bear scrutiny.51 
Another threshold objection contends that framing-era practices and understandings 
are an unreliable indicator of constitutional provisions that are aspirational in 
nature.52 Even for constitutional provisions with an aspirational character, however, 
practices and understandings that survived the wake of ratification could surely be 
thought consistent with original meaning.  
 A more serious problem is that original-expected-applications originalism will 
be of no help in addressing issues that did not arise in the framing era. Consider 
Weems v. United States.53 At issue was whether the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments”54 barred the use of cadena 
temporal—a punishment originating in the Spanish Penal Code involving fifteen 
years at hard labor while painfully shackled, followed by permanent surveillance 
and disqualification from any position of public trust and the loss of parental and 
other civil rights—for falsifying entries involving relatively small sums in 
government ledgers.55 The Court explained that the evidence from the framing era 
suggested that the Eighth Amendment was intended to prohibit the kinds of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 856–61. 
 51. To be sure, the difficulty of assessing historical evidence is sometimes great, and 
that may pose considerable problems for originalism. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 
S. Ct. 3020 (2010), for example, eight Justices rejected an argument that the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause made the 
protections of the first eight amendments enforceable against the states, in significant part 
because of uncertainty about the Clause’s original meaning. See id. at 3030 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3132–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Four of 
the five Justices who supported incorporation of the Second Amendment within the 
Fourteenth relied on the Due Process Clause without any claim that incorporation was 
consistent with the original meaning of that clause. See id. at 3030–31, 3050 (plurality 
opinion); see also id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“[N]either [the plurality nor the dissents] argues that the meaning they attribute 
to the Due Process Clause was consistent with public understanding at the time of its 
ratification.”). Indeed, in terms of original public meaning, incorporation of the first eight 
amendments within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes little sense 
because it renders the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses redundant. 
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63–66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For an 
analysis of this issue by a leading originalist who concedes that nonoriginalist construction 
may be required to determine if the Fourteenth Amendment makes the first eight 
amendments applicable to the states, see Solum, supra note 26, at 419–45. 
 52. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1631, 1644–51 (2009); Tribe, supra note 23, at 87–91. 
 53. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 55. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362–65. 
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punishment imposed under the Stuart kings of England that had come to be 
regarded as excessive.56 Even though the cadena temporal did not resemble any of 
these punishments, the Court nevertheless concluded that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment in light of the imbalance between the severity of the punishment and 
the gravity of the offense.57 
It is hard not to sympathize with Weems; if the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
only those punishments labeled as cruel and unusual in the framing era, the 
Constitution would offer no protection against the creation of new punishments that 
produce chilling pain and terror in novel ways. This seems an untenable approach 
to a textual prohibition framed at a level of considerable generality. Even Justice 
Scalia concedes that the Eighth Amendment states “an abstract principle,” and for 
that reason applies “to all sorts of tortures quite unknown at the time the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted.”58 He also appears to accept the holding of Weems.59 
A similar problem arose in Clinton v. Jones60 when the Court considered 
whether the Constitution’s delegation of executive power to the president meant 
that a sitting president could not be compelled to face trial in a civil action arising 
out of conduct occurring before he took office, because such a trial could impede 
the president in the discharge of his constitutional duties. The Court observed that 
no remotely comparable issue arose during the framing era; therefore, the Court 
concluded that historical inquiry shed no light on the issue.61 And, in Boumediene 
v. Bush,62 the Court declined to rely on framing-era practice to determine whether 
the constitutional right to challenge the legality of one’s detention by writ of habeas 
corpus applied to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—where Cuba technically 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Id. at 371–72. 
 57. Id. at 377–82. The Court also advanced a classic argument against reliance on 
original expected applications: 
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an 
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be 
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works 
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a 
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief 
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not 
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the 
words of Chief Justice Marshall, “designed to approach immortality as nearly 
as human institutions can approach it.” The future is their care and provision for 
events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the 
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of 
what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would 
indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. 
Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into 
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in 
reality.  
Id. at 373. 
 58. Scalia, supra note 14, at 145 (emphasis in original). 
 59. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990–92 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 60. 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 61. Id. at 695–97. 
 62. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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retains sovereignty but the United States exercises complete control under a 
perpetual lease—since there was no analogous framing-era practice and the 
relevant historical record was incomplete.63  
Thus, an approach to constitutional interpretation that depends on framing-era 
practices and understandings to flesh out the original meaning of the Constitution’s 
vague or ambiguous provisions is of no aid when facing problems that did not arise 
in the framing era. But beyond this deficiency, there is the problem of changed 
circumstances. 
2. Original-Expected-Applications Originalism and Changed Circumstances 
An even more serious problem with a reliance on original expected applications 
to guide the interpretation of vague or ambiguous constitutional text is that 
framing-era understandings and practice may be irrelevant to contemporary 
circumstances. This point was central to Brown; in light of the changes in 
importance of public education since the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court concluded that in assessing the constitutionality of racial segregation 
under the Equal Protection clause: “We must consider public education in the light 
of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the 
Nation.”64 The problem, however, is not confined to matters of racial 
discrimination. Consider Justice White’s Fourth Amendment originalism.  
Justice White was no foe of using framing-era practices and understandings to 
illustrate the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures; for example, he authored the opinion of the Court in United 
States v. Watson,65 in which the Court relied on the framing-era law of arrest as it 
held that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests on probable cause to 
believe that the arrestee had committed a felony.66 Yet, in Tennessee v. Garner,67 
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court invalidating a state statute codifying 
the framing-era rule that deadly force could be used to stop a fleeing felon, 
concluding: “Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context, 
reliance on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that 
ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry.”68 The framing-era rule, Justice White 
reasoned, was a consequence of “the relative dangerousness of felons,” as well as 
the fact that “virtually all felonies were punishable by death,” but since then, most 
felonies had become noncapital offenses and many nondangerous offenses had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Id. at 746–52. 
 64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
 65. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
 66. Id. at 418–23. Justice White’s commitment to framing-era practice as illuminating 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment was not ephemeral; he later dissented from the 
Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to make a forcible entry into 
an arrestee’s home for purpose of effecting an arrest, on the ground that this holding was 
unsupported by framing-era practice. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 604–14 (1980) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
 67. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 68. Id. at 13. 
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become classified as felonies.69 “These changes have undermined the 
concept . . . that use of deadly force against a fleeing felon is merely a speedier 
execution of someone who has already forfeited his life. They have also made the 
assumption that a ‘felon’ is more dangerous than a misdemeanant untenable.”70 
Moreover, arrests were more dangerous affairs in the framing era, “when weapons 
were rudimentary.”71 Accordingly, “though the common-law pedigree of 
Tennessee’s rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological context 
mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied.”72 
Thus, Justice White believed that the framing-era judgment about the 
reasonableness of using deadly force against a fleeing felon was based on a 
framing-era context no longer relevant.73 
One of the most potent charges against originalism is that it “depends on using 
history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying 
attention to historical context.”74 As Garner illustrates, strong original-expected-
applications originalism is particularly vulnerable to this charge: changed 
circumstances may undermine the relevance of framing-era understandings or 
practice to contemporary circumstances.75 To be sure, some constitutional text 
seems to codify framing-era practice. The Seventh Amendment, for example, 
provides: “In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”76 This formulation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Id. at 13–14 (footnote omitted). 
 70. Id. at 14.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 15. 
 73. Even the dissenters would not embrace framing-era practice without regard to 
changed circumstances, although they afforded it greater weight: 
Although the Court has recognized that the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment must respond to the reality of social and technological change, 
fidelity to the notion of constitutional—as opposed to purely judicial—limits on 
governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those who claim 
that practices accepted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted are now 
constitutionally impermissible. 
Id. at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 74. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188. 
 75. Indeed, Professor Davies has argued that the framers’ focus on general warrants was 
itself a product of contemporary circumstances; in particular, the considerable evidence that 
the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment as limited to a prohibition on general 
warrants was a consequence of the fact that general warrants were understood as the only 
abuse of power likely to emerge from the federal government. See Davies, supra note 29, at 
619–68. He concludes:  
Applying the original meaning of the language of the Fourth Amendment in a 
completely changed social and institutional context would subvert the purpose 
the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text. They focused on banning 
general warrants because they perceived the general warrant as the only means 
by which discretionary search authority might be conferred. 
Id. at 740–41 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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seems to constitutionalize framing-era jury rights, and the Court has therefore 
turned to framing-era practice as the basis for interpreting this constitutional 
guarantee.77 But, as we have seen, nonoriginalists claim the open-ended provisions 
of the Constitution as their own—those most readily characterized as vague or 
ambiguous—and it is far from clear that framing-era practice supplies a reliable 
guide to their original meaning in light of changed circumstances. Christopher 
Eisgruber has made the point this way: 
Suppose that Grandpa is on his deathbed, and he whispers to Sonny, 
“Just promise me this Sonny: eat only healthy food.” Sonny, eager to 
grant this modest request, makes the promise. Grandpa dies, 
confidently believing (as Sonny well knows) that raw fish and red wine 
are bad for you and that whole milk is good for you. Now suppose 
Sonny becomes convinced, on the basis of subsequent scientific 
studies, that sushi and Chianti are part of a healthy diet but that whole 
milk is not. We can argue, I suppose, about whether Sonny, if he 
wishes to honor his promise, should eat or refuse sushi. But we should 
in any case be able to agree that the concept “healthy” does not become 
meaningless if divorced from Grandpa’s outdated beliefs about what is 
healthy. If Sonny decides to eat sushi, he will still be acting on the basis 
of a promise to eat healthy food.78 
Indeed, slavish adherence to framing-era practices and understandings without 
inquiry into changed circumstances puts one in mind of Holmes’s famous axiom: 
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it 
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.”79 There is surely a powerful argument that when the 
constitutional text does not expressly codify a framing-era rule, but rather states a 
more general standard, the standard should be applied in light of contemporary 
understandings rather than framing-era conceptions that may be outmoded or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 
708 (1999); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–52 (1998); 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
U.S. 531, 533–34 (1970). For contrasting views of the original meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 89–93 (1998) (Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury in federal court only 
when a jury is available in state court); Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of 
the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 479–83 (1999) 
(Seventh Amendment leaves federal jury rights to congressional discretion); and Rachael E. 
Schwartz, “Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines”: An Alternative Interpretation 
of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 616–29 (1996) (same). 
 78. EISGRUBER, supra note 17, at 29. For similar discussions, see, for example, RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291–94 
(1996); and Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1170–71 
(1993). 
 79. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). 
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irrelevant.80 There is even an originalist argument in support of this conclusion; as 
Lee Strang, a committed originalist, has written: “A reasonable person in the 
position of the Framers and Ratifiers would ‘draw their Constitution loosely 
enough so that it might live and breathe and change with time.’”81 Thus, there is 
reason to believe that the problem of changed circumstances is a serious one for 
original-expected-applications originalism. 
Even Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence acknowledges this flaw in 
original-expected-applications originalism. As we have seen, Justice Scalia 
professes adherence to original-expected-applications originalism; in particular, 
reliance on original expected applications is evident in his Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. For example, he wrote the opinion of the Court in Wyoming v. 
Houghton,82 which contains a paradigmatic reliance on original expected 
applications: “In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this 
provision, we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or 
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed.”83 Yet Justice 
Scalia, like Justice White, acknowledges the need to retreat from original expected 
applications in the face of changed circumstances. Consider Kyllo v. United 
States.84  
In the framing era, only a physical trespass was thought to be an unlawful 
invasion of the privacy of the home, and for that reason, in its first encounter with 
electronic surveillance, the Court held that wiretapping unaccompanied by a 
physical trespass to the home was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.85 As Justice Scalia observed, “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was 
tied to common-law trespass.”86 Nevertheless, in Kyllo, Justice Scalia wrote the 
opinion of the Court holding that the use of a thermal imaging device that, although 
positioned on public property outside of a home, discloses “the relative heat of 
various rooms in the home,”87 amounts to a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment:  
[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical 
and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 10–16, 75–81; Dorf, supra note 23, at 1804–10; 
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 84. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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 86. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. 
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a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal 
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation 
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into 
a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search—at least where 
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.88  
Thus, advancing technology constituted a changed circumstance that required a 
departure from the framing-era understanding that an unlawful invasion of the 
security of the home required a physical trespass. Accordingly, even Justice Scalia 
is prepared to reject strong original-expected-applications originalism based on 
changed circumstances. The same is true of the Court’s other professed originalist. 
Although Justice Thomas has never advanced a fully developed theory of 
constitutional interpretation, he also claims fealty to originalism.89 Yet he joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo. 
Also consider Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.90 Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the Court, addressing the constitutionality of random drug testing of high school 
athletes, first acknowledged that a mandatory urine test “constitutes a ‘search’ 
subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment,”91 and then stated,  
[I]n a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either 
approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the 
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets 
the reasonableness standard “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”92  
Applying that test, the Court upheld mandatory urinalysis of students engaged in 
interscholastic sports.93  
 As it happens, however, there were at least two candidates for a pertinent 
framing-era practice in Acton. On the one hand, the general framing-era rule was 
that searches of individuals were permitted only if incident to a valid arrest. As 
William Cuddihy concluded in his exhaustive analysis of the historical evidence, 
“by 1789, body searches were derivatives of the arrest process, and Americans had 
little recent experience with personal searches apart from that process.”94 A 
warrantless misdemeanor arrest was improper if the offense had not been 
committed in the presence of the person making the arrest or the arrestee was not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
 89. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996). 
 90. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 91. Id. at 652. 
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actually guilty of the offense, and a warrantless felony arrest was not permitted 
unless a felony had in fact been committed and there was reasonable grounds to 
believe that the arrestee had committed the offense.95 Indeed, just a few years 
before Acton, Justice Scalia had acknowledged the framing-era impropriety of a 
search of a person absent a basis to make an arrest.96 Under this framing-era rule, 
the random drug tests at issue in Acton would be readily condemned. On the other 
hand, Justice Thomas, while joining Justice Scalia’s opinion in Acton, in a 
subsequent case contended that the framing-era rule of in loco parentis, which 
afforded public schools virtually unfettered power over children in their charge, 
supports a rule granting equally broad discretion to contemporary public schools 
with respect to the search and seizure of students.97 
Strikingly, in Acton, Justice Scalia applied neither of these framing-era rules. 
His opinion of the Court makes no express comment on the framing-era law of 
arrest, but it observes that outside of the context of a search “undertaken by law 
enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,” the Court had 
held that searches unsupported by probable cause are thought constitutionally 
reasonable “‘when special needs, beyond the normal need of law enforcement, 
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”98 As for the 
framing-era conception of in loco parentis, Justice Scalia observed that compulsory 
school attendance laws were uncommon in the framing era.99 The implication, of 
course, is the framing-era concept of in loco parentis involved a voluntary 
delegation of parental authority to school officials, but the notion that parents 
voluntarily delegate their authority to public school officials in the contemporary 
regime of compulsory school attendance is doubtful at best.100 Thus, Justice Scalia 
found the analogy to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis instructive but 
incomplete, and relied on the doctrine only to the extent that it illuminated the 
nature of a student’s privacy interests under a nonoriginalist balancing test.101 
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Accordingly, changes from the historical context in which both of the potentially 
applicable framing-era rules evolved led Justice Scalia to regard neither as 
dispositive. Indeed, a consistent theme in Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment 
originalism is his willingness to depart from framing-era rules on the basis of a 
pertinent change in circumstances.102 
Justice Scalia’s willingness to depart from framing-era practice is not limited to 
the Fourth Amendment. For example, writing for a three-justice plurality in 
Burnham v. Superior Court,103 Justice Scalia embraced the framing-era rule that 
personal jurisdiction could be exercised whenever a defendant was physically 
served in the forum state consistent with due process,104 but also defended the more 
recent emergence of jurisdictional doctrine that permits absent defendants to be 
haled into a forum state as a necessary response to “changes in the technology of 
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate 
business activity.”105 Thus, in his view, the Due Process Clause did not freeze 
framing-era jurisdictional practice in place; such an approach, he acknowledged, 
“would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of 
progress or improvement.”106  
Similarly, in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection,107 in response to Justice Kennedy’s observation that in 
the framing era a “taking” of property within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition on taking of public property without the payment of just 
compensation was understood to refer to physical appropriation of property through 
a legislature’s exercise of the power of eminent domain,108 Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for a four-justice plurality (including Justice Thomas) took the position that a 
“taking” within the meaning of the Takings Clause nevertheless could be 
accomplished by a judicial decision that radically altered property rights, 
explaining that “the Framers did not envision the Takings Clause would apply to 
judicial action” only because “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts 
had no power to ‘change’ the common law.”109 Thus, what Justice Scalia regarded 
as a pertinent change in the applicable legal context warranted adoption of an 
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understanding of the concept of a “taking” unsupported by framing-era practice. In 
Citizens United v. FEC,110 responding to an argument that framing-era practice did 
not support granting corporations First Amendment rights because corporations 
were regarded as subject to plenary regulation in the framing era,111 Justice Scalia 
wrote: “Most of the Founders’ resentment towards corporations was directed at the 
state-granted monopoly privileges that individually chartered corporations enjoyed. 
Modern corporations do not have such privileges . . . .”112 Once again, Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that framing-era practice can be discounted if it is regarded as 
dependent on the historical context in which it developed. In addition, we have seen 
that Justice Scalia is willing to depart from framing-era practice when it comes to 
racial segregation.113 We will see other examples of Justice Scalia’s willingness to 
depart from framing-era practice in Part III below. 
As for the Court’s other professed originalist, while Justice Thomas may more 
often be faithful to original expected applications than Justice Scalia, he is also 
willing to depart from framing-era practice on what he regards as sufficient 
justification. For example, in addition to joining Justice Scalia’s discussions of the 
need to move beyond framing-era practice in Kyllo, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
and Citizens United, Justice Thomas has written that the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
his view, prohibits the government from making any use of race in decision 
making.114 Yet, as we have seen, this view has little support in framing-era 
practice.115 Nor has Justice Thomas articulated any originalist basis rooted in 
historical evidence of original meaning for identifying what should be regarded as a 
sufficient basis to depart from framing-era practice. 
To be sure, as we have seen, there are occasions on which Justices Scalia and 
Thomas find framing-era practice controlling. The key point is not that on some 
occasions these Justices have departed from original expected applications, but 
rather that even they acknowledge that framing-era practice and understandings 
cannot be uncritically applied to contemporary circumstances that may render 
framing-era judgments obsolete or irrelevant. Once one has the option to depart 
from framing-era rules if there is adequate justification for doing so, however, 
strong original-expected-applications originalism supplies no reliable originalist 
technique for interpreting vague or ambiguous constitutional text. When many 
years have passed between the framing and the occasion for constitutional 
adjudication, any advocate with even a modicum of creativity will generally be able 
to identify some sort of changed circumstance. Yet strong original-expected-
applications originalism offers no originalist methodology for evaluating claims 
based on changed circumstances. Consequently, in the face of a claim of changed 
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circumstances, this brand of originalism necessarily devolves into a nonoriginalist 
debate on the significance and meaning of the proffered claim of changed 
circumstances.116 An originalism that treats framing-era practices and 
understandings as inevitably dispositive, in contrast, can be the touchstone for 
constitutional interpretation only if one is willing to ignore Holmes’s admonition 
and rely on history even when the rationale for historical practice is later 
undermined by changed circumstances. 
In short, the same sort of changed circumstances that nonoriginalists claim offer 
support for ascribing evolving content to the Constitution cause strong original-
expected-applications originalism to collapse. As a result, strong original-expected-
applications originalism cannot in practice be distinguished from nonoriginalism 
unless there is a genuinely originalist interpretative technique available for 
determining when framing-era practices and understandings should be rejected as 
outmoded. While strong original-expected-applications originalism offers no such 
technique, a weaker form of original-expected-applications originalism capable of 
accommodating changed circumstances has endeavored to come to grips with this 
problem. 
B. Weak Original-Expected-Applications Originalism  
One might agree that in a strong form in which framing-era practices and 
understandings are treated as interpretively binding, original-expected-applications 
originalism is untenable; but in a weaker form, it could still be of value as a starting 
point for constitutional interpretation. Such an originalism could, for example, 
place a burden of justification on those who advocate a departure from the framing-
era baseline.117  
1. Weak Original-Expected-Applications Originalism and Nonoriginalism 
It is questionable whether, in practice, weak original-expected-applications 
originalism is any different from nonoriginalism. As we have seen, originalism 
requires that the meaning of constitutional text be fixed at the framing.118 An 
originalism that uses framing-era understandings to flesh out vague or ambiguous 
constitutional text, but permits departure from framing-era understandings on what 
is regarded as adequate justification, seems to blur into nonoriginalism. Indeed, 
nonoriginalist adjudication often takes the same form as weak original-expected-
applications originalism. 
In its famously nonoriginalist decision in Brown v. Board of Education, for 
example, the Court began its discussion with framing-era practice and proceeded to 
explain that changed circumstances made reference to framing-era practice 
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inappropriate.119 The same pattern is evident in most of the nonoriginalist decisions 
of the Court. When the Court held that the Eighth Amendment imposes limitations 
on capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia,120 two Justices wrote strikingly 
nonoriginalist opinions in which they concluded that capital punishment had 
become inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment, but even these opinions started 
with framing-era practice and understandings, only to conclude that evolving social 
norms warranted a departure from the framing-era understanding.121 Similarly, 
when the Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion under the Due Process 
Clause in Roe v. Wade,122 it engaged in a lengthy inquiry into the history of 
abortion regulation up to and beyond the framing era,123 concluding that advances 
in medical technology had made obsolete many of the judgments that had 
traditionally underlain abortion regulation in the framing era.124 The Court then 
held that the only remaining and still-pertinent state interest in protecting human 
life was inadequate to sustain a prohibition on abortion prior to viability.125 More 
recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,126 in the course of invalidating a statutory 
prohibition on same-sex sodomy in private among consenting adults under the Due 
Process Clause, the Court canvassed framing-era practice, only to question its 
significance given that framing-era statutes were not directed at homosexual 
conduct and were rarely enforced with respect to private conduct.127 The Court then 
embraced a nonoriginalist approach to due process in light of the broad terms of the 
constitutional text and the inability of the framers to anticipate social evolution.128 
Whether one condemns or approves of these decisions, it should be plain that a 
methodology requiring some justification for a departure from framing-era practice 
when interpreting the Constitution is not unique to originalism; nor is it anything 
close to a guarantee that adjudication will be based on a historically fixed meaning 
of constitutional text. Once one agrees that framing-era practices and 
understandings are not conclusive, pretty much everything is fair game. Moreover, 
in such a jurisprudence, adjudication does not turn on historically fixed original 
meaning, but instead on a nonoriginalist evaluation of the arguments for departure 
from the framing-era understanding of vague or ambiguous constitutional text. 
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2. Translating Original Expected Applications  
To illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing weak original-expected-applications 
originalism from nonoriginalism, consider the approach of perhaps its most 
prominent academic advocate, Lawrence Lessig, who contends that the 
presuppositions underlying framing-era practices and understandings must be 
identified and then “translated” in light of contemporary understandings and 
circumstances.129 Under this approach, one does not have to work very hard to 
repudiate an original expected application. When centuries have passed between 
the framing of constitutional text and the time that a court is required to interpret it, 
a good deal will have changed, and virtually any argument asserting that framing-
era practices or understandings based on a now-obsolete presupposition can be 
sufficient, under Professor Lessig’s methodology, to justify a repudiation of 
framing-era practice.  
For example, Professor Lessig defends the famously nonoriginalist decision 
utilizing the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelling any person to be a 
witness against himself to regulate custodial police interrogation in Miranda v. 
Arizona,130 arguing that although framing-era interrogation of criminal suspects 
was a part of the judicial process, once modern police forces undertook custodial 
interrogation, the framing-era presupposition that only the judicial process need be 
regulated in order to protect the right against compelled self-incrimination became 
obsolete.131 He justifies the New Deal-era expansion in the scope of congressional 
power to regulate interstate commerce on the ground that the framing-era 
supposition that only a limited set of transactions need be regulated in order to 
protect the flow of interstate commerce had been made obsolete by an emerging 
understanding that a much broader realm of activity could have an impact on the 
national economy.132 He similarly argues that framing-era suppositions about the 
character of discrimination that was thought sufficiently odious to offend the Equal 
Protection Clause have gradually expanded to include all forms of race 
discrimination, as well as discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy, sex, and, 
eventually, he predicts, sexual orientation as well.133 
As these examples should demonstrate, once one starts playing the translation 
game, it is pretty easy to gin up some excuse for setting framing-era practices and 
understandings aside. As Professor Lessig’s critics note, it will almost always be 
possible to identify some arguably relevant supposition that has changed since the 
framing era.134 Moreover, once such an argument against framing-era practice is 
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offered, it can be rejected only based on a nonoriginalist evaluation of the relevance 
of framing-era suppositions to contemporary circumstances. For his part, Lessig 
offers only two constraints imposed by his brand of original-expected-applications 
originalism—a changed reading of constitutional text cannot be based on a fact or 
belief that would have produced a different text in the first instance, nor can a 
changed reading transgress the institutional limitations on the judiciary to assess 
complex factual or policy issues or deeply contested ethical concepts.135 It is hard 
to identify any nonoriginalist decision that offends the first limitation; as we have 
seen, nonoriginalists rely only on the type of vague or open-ended texts that 
accommodate evolving content. As for the second, Professor Lessig does not claim 
that this principle has any originalist justification; he identifies no historical 
evidence that this type of prudential concern was a part of the original meaning of 
any portion of the Constitution. Indeed, as we will see below, even when assessed 
in terms of original meaning, there is no constitutional text that requires the 
judiciary to defer to legislative policy or ethical choices. Nor is Lessig’s second 
principle distinguishable from nonoriginalism. There is no necessary inconsistency 
between nonoriginalism and a prudent concern for the limited institutional 
capabilities of the judiciary. 
The examples canvassed above in which Justice Scalia departed from framing-
era practice reflect the inability to articulate an originalist methodology for 
adapting, or “translating,” framing-era practice to contemporary circumstances. In 
Kyllo, for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas were willing to depart from the 
framing-era rule that required a physical trespass to constitute an invasion of a 
legally protected interest in the privacy of the home to prevent what they regarded 
as an erosion of constitutional protection as a consequence of technological 
advance.136 Yet the framing-era requirement of a physical trespass necessarily 
enabled the trespasser—by utilizing all five senses from within the home—to learn 
a great deal more than can be revealed through a thermal image. Moreover, as then-
Professor Posner once observed, a trespassory search and seizure involves healthy 
doses of force and coercion absent in electronic surveillance, of which the target is 
usually unaware.137 Thus, although, in Kyllo, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court’s 
holding “assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that 
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,”138 we have no way of knowing 
whether, in the framing era, the limited intrusion on the home accomplished by a 
thermal imager would have been regarded an invasion of an interest too ephemeral 
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to merit legal protection—the argument that Justice Stevens advanced in dissent.139 
The Court’s holding in Kyllo may be correct, but not based on the historical 
evidence that framing-era practice is properly “translated” to jettison the 
requirement of a physical trespass when a technological “trespass” by thermal 
image compromises the privacy of the home to a far lesser extent than a framing-
era physical trespass. It may be normatively desirable to recognize Fourth 
Amendment protection for every aspect of the home that would have been free 
from official scrutiny in the framing era absent a physical trespass, but such a 
conclusion is again driven purely by a nonoriginalist concern with technological 
erosion of privacy, not the framing-era conception of a legally protected interest in 
the privacy of the home, which required a far greater intrusion on privacy than is 
accomplished by thermal imaging. Indeed, even Professor Lessig has 
acknowledged that the framers never “worked out what the amendment would 
protect in a world where perfectly noninvasive searches could be 
conducted. . . . [W]e need to make that choice.”140 
The same problem appears in Acton. We have no way of knowing how the 
framing-era practice that forbade search and seizure absent a basis to make an 
arrest, or the framing-era conception of school officials acting in loco parentis, is 
properly applied to searches of students at public schools. As we have seen, 
translating either the framing-era law of arrest or the framing-era conception of in 
loco parentis to the context of the contemporary public-school searches is perilous; 
neither is precisely analogous to the contemporary public school.141 Whatever 
conclusion one draws, moreover, will not be based on the historically fixed 
meaning of constitutional text, but instead will be based on a nonoriginalist 
assessment of the significance of changed circumstances. Thus, Acton, like Kyllo, 
presents all the dangers of counterfactual historical analysis. Given the difficulties 
in translating framing-era practice to public schools operating under compulsory 
school attendance laws, historical evidence can supply no reliable basis for 
adjudication.  
More recently, in United States v. Jones,142 in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the 
Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and its subsequent use to 
monitor the movements of a vehicle was a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment; relying on the framing-era rule that “no man can set his foot 
upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser,”143 
Justice Scalia reasoned that to “‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,’”144 the 
Fourth Amendment should be “understood to embody a particular concern for 
government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it 
enumerates.”145 Yet, although Justice Scalia invoked the framing-era conception of 
trespass to support the Court’s holding, it is doubtful that we can fairly equate the 
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attachment and monitoring of a GPS device to anything that arose in the framing-
era law of trespass. As Justice Alito noted in his separate opinion, “it is almost 
impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took 
place in this case,” such as “a case in which a constable secreted himself 
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor 
the movements of the coach’s owner,” and, he added, “this would have required 
either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.”146 Even in such a 
hypothetical, however, by using all his senses, the constable would have learned 
more than the limited information transmitted by a GPS device, and he could not 
have simultaneously informed his colleagues of his location in the manner that a 
GPS device instantaneously transmits data. Indeed, Justice Scalia ultimately 
disclaimed reliance on framing-era practice, writing: “[I]t is quite irrelevant 
whether there was an 18th-century analog.”147 Accordingly, Justice Scalia 
effectively acknowledged that the Court’s holding was not simply an exercise in 
translating original expected applications.  
Thus, a jurisprudence that relies on original expected applications to decide 
cases involving significantly different circumstances cannot claim to be doing no 
more than applying original expected applications; a judgment is required as to 
whether the change in circumstances warrants a departure from original expected 
applications. Yet, a jurisprudence that permits departure from framing-era 
understandings and practice as long as someone can think of a good reason for 
doing so means that adjudication is ultimately based not on historical evidence of 
original meaning, but rather on a nonoriginalist consideration of whether framing-
era practices and understandings have become obsolete. This, of course, is the 
essence of nonoriginalism, which ascribes evolving content to vague or ambiguous 
constitutional text. If departures from framing-era practice are to be permitted by 
originalism, then there must be a distinctively originalist methodology for assessing 
the propriety of such departures. In its actual practice, original-expected-
applications originalism fails this challenge. Semantic originalism, in contrast, 
claims to offer an originalism that can accommodate the challenge of changed 
circumstances. 
II. SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM 
Most originalists draw a distinction between the original meaning of 
constitutional text and its originally intended applications, arguing that only the 
former is interpretively binding.148 Michael McConnell has even claimed that “no 
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reputable originalist . . . takes the view that the Framers’ ‘assumptions and 
expectation about the correct application’ of their principles is 
controlling. . . . Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of 
particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed 
and made them wrong.”149 Even Justice Scalia agrees that what is binding is 
“semantic intention” and not “the concrete expectations of lawgivers.”150 Thus, a 
semantic form of originalism is the predominant approach, in which constitutional 
interpretation is not based on the intentions of the framers or the original expected 
applications of constitutional text, but rather on the original meaning of the text 
stated at the level of generality found in the text.151 Semantic originalism, by 
evading the problems said to pervade reliance on the original intentions of the 
framers popular among the previous generation of originalists, is sometimes 
referred to as the “New Originalism.”152 
The problems with this account emerge when semantic originalism is applied to 
the open-ended constitutional text that nonoriginalists claim as their domain. The 
original meaning of such text may be so indeterminate or stated at such a high level 
of generality that semantic originalism may be effectively indistinguishable from 
nonoriginalism.153 Consider again the Fourth Amendment.  
In Jones, after the Court asserted that it “[wa]s quite irrelevant whether there 
was an 18th-century analog” to the installation and use of a GPS device, the Court 
added: “Whatever new methods of investigation may be devised, our task, at a 
minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted a 
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”154 This sounds 
like semantic originalism but, in Jones, the Court offered no semantic evidence of 
“the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment”; instead, it relied solely on 
framing-era tort law which, of course, even the Court acknowledged did not 
address anything fairly analogous to the installation and use of a GPS device. 
Indeed, semantic originalism seems to offer little help in a case like Jones since, as 
we have seen, the original semantic meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizures was so expansive—search or 
seizure was considered unreasonable either if it was deemed illegal or contrary to 
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sound judgment.155 Both formulations offer little more than a legal conclusion, 
however, and once original expected applications are rejected as the basis for 
assessing either illegality or sound judgment, the original semantic meaning 
offered by the Fourth Amendment’s text seems so capacious that it produces an 
approach to constitutional interpretation little different from nonoriginalism.156 
The holding in Jones is likely defensible if one thinks that technological advance 
may not erode legal protections against any form of official scrutiny, but this is a 
nonoriginalist claim—it is not an original expected application, nor is it premised 
on any historical evidence about the original semantic meaning of the prohibition 
on “unreasonable search and seizure” divorced from original expected applications. 
Richard Kay, himself an advocate of relying on the framers’ intentions to 
determine original meaning, has suggested that once original expected applications 
of constitutional text are cast aside, original meaning is likely to be so 
indeterminate that originalism will no longer be of much use in constitutional 
adjudication.157 There is surely something to Professor Kay’s point. If the original 
expected applications of constitutional text are irrelevant, and if the original 
meaning of the more open-ended constitutional text on which nonoriginalists rely 
can only be defined at a high level of generality, unhelpful to the resolution of most 
constitutional disputes, it may be that semantic originalism will prove effectively 
useless. For example, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman advocate a semantic 
originalism based not on what they call “historically concrete understandings”; 
instead they “conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms: What would a fully-
informed public audience, in possession of all relevant information about the 
Constitution and the world around it, have understood the Constitution to mean?”158 
Other semantic originalists place greater weight on the framing-era public’s 
understanding of the Constitution’s text.159 In either guise, these formulations may 
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original expected applications, and accordingly encounters the problems canvassed in Part I 
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have an appealing ring, but it is unclear that they provide much concrete guidance 
for constitutional adjudication, especially when assessing claims that changed 
circumstances have rendered framing-era practices and understandings obsolete. If 
semantic originalism is to be considered of value in constitutional adjudication, we 
should expect evidence that it provides a vehicle for providing some important 
number of cases in an authentically originalist fashion.  
No member of the Supreme Court has professed allegiance to a semantic 
originalism that treats original expected applications as nonbinding. Thus, although 
the jurisprudence of Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, enables us to study 
in some detail original-expected-applications originalism in practice, there is no 
body of semantic originalism jurisprudence to be studied. The closest the Court has 
come to embracing semantic originalism is the decision in Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co.,160 in which the Court rejected due process and equal protection 
attacks on a zoning ordinance even though “zone laws are of modern origin,”161 
explaining:  
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to 
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly 
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would 
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are 
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons 
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the 
advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have 
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there 
is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties 
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to 
meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming 
within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible 
that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus 
imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional 
principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to 
the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the 
Constitution, of course, must fall.162 
Applying this approach, the Court upheld the challenged zoning law on the ground 
that the justifications advanced for separating municipalities into zones of less and 
more intensive uses of land “are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as 
it must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such 
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”163 
Euclid’s brand of originalism, which holds the meaning of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses constant, while permitting them to be applied in novel 
ways in light of contemporary circumstances, sounds quite like semantic 
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originalism. Yet, it is far from clear that Euclid’s originalism is any more confining 
than nonoriginalism. Historical evidence of original meaning seems to do no real 
analytical work in Euclid; the Court’s decision was based wholly on an assessment 
of the contemporary rationale for zoning laws. Still, one might hesitate to draw any 
reliable conclusions about the difference between semantic originalism and 
nonoriginalism from a dataset consisting of one case. Given the infrequency with 
which semantic originalism can be found in the Court’s jurisprudence, the Court’s 
work does not enable anything like a complete assessment of semantic originalism 
in practice. Indeed, the paucity of semantic or “new” originalism in the Court’s 
jurisprudence may itself suggest its lack of utility in the real world of constitutional 
adjudication—originalism surely seemed of little real analytical aid in Euclid given 
the high level of generality reflected in the original semantic meaning of the Due 
Process Clause as condemning “arbitrary and oppressive” regulations.164 Still, a 
number of the scholarly advocates of semantic originalism have endeavored to 
demonstrate how it works in practice. The evidence from these scholarly treatments 
of semantic originalism, however, suggests that it is unable, in practice, to provide 
an authentically originalist vehicle for deciding cases based on historical evidence 
of original meaning. 
A. Liberal Semantic Originalism  
Consider Professor Balkin’s version of semantic originalism. Balkin believes 
that original meaning sets the boundaries or “framework” for constitutional 
adjudication at the same level of generality that is to be found in the governing 
constitutional text.165 Balkin’s originalist framework for adjudication, however, 
provides no less leeway for nonoriginalist adjudication than is granted by 
nonoriginalist accounts.  
For example, Professor Balkin advances an originalist argument for a 
constitutional right to abortion on the ground that the original semantic meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause embodied a broad equality 
principle that forbade the government to treat any identifiable class as a disfavored 
caste, and then proceeds to argue that a prohibition on abortion involves 
unconstitutional discrimination by subjecting women to the burden of carrying a 
pregnancy to term in the service of a governmental interest in protecting life—a 
burden not imposed on men.166 One might question whether, as a matter of 
historically fixed original meaning, the Fourteenth Amendment contains a very 
robust anti-caste principle, given the evidence that it was originally understood to 
permit racial segregation.167 But put that aside. Even crediting Balkin’s account of 
original meaning, it is far from clear that abortion laws are fairly characterized as 
creating a disfavored caste.  
The case for prohibiting abortion is not made in terms of subordinating women; 
rather, abortion opponents argue that the only way the government can vindicate its 
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interest in the preservation of life—whether present or future—is to prohibit 
abortion, even though the regulation will have a greater physical impact on 
women.168 We do not necessarily think of this kind of differential burden as 
involving discrimination or the creation of a subordinate caste. The approach the 
Court has taken in its equal protection jurisprudence is to treat laws as 
discriminatory only when “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ and not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects on an identifiable group.”169 Applying this rule, the Court has held that 
efforts to discourage abortion do not amount to discrimination against women.170 
Professor Balkin is unhappy with this doctrine, but he offers no argument that this 
conception is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.171 
There may well be good arguments on behalf of the view that abortion laws 
discriminate on the basis of sex,172 though there are potent counterarguments as 
well.173 For present purposes, however, what is most important is that even on 
Professor Balkin’s account, there is nothing in the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that produces a right to abortion. Balkin makes no 
argument that current doctrine’s refusal to condemn laws that have an adverse 
impact on a discrete group as long as they are justified by some nondiscriminatory 
governmental interest is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Whether abortion laws treat women as a subordinate caste is a 
question that Balkin endeavors to resolve not based on any historically fixed 
meaning of constitutional text, but based on a decidedly nonoriginalist view about 
what amounts to discrimination against women. The only guidance that Balkin 
finds in history is to identify an equality principle in the Fourteenth Amendment.174 
How this differs from nonoriginalist approaches to the Equal Protection Clause is 
entirely unclear. In Brown, for example, history did no more of the analytical work: 
explicitly declining to make any use of history, the Court nevertheless embraced 
the same equality principle that Balkin trumpets, and used it to conclude that 
separate-but-equal segregation effectively subordinated African Americans and was 
therefore unconstitutional.175 History plays no greater role in Balkin’s claim that 
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abortion laws unconstitutionally discriminate against women. The analytical heavy 
lifting is performed by nonoriginalist claims about the meaning of discrimination. 
Balkin’s originalism quacks an awful lot like a nonoriginalist duck.176 
The same problem is evident in the other argument for a constitutional right to 
abortion that Professor Balkin advances—he claims that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment177 protects abortion because the 
original meaning of the clause was to secure rights regarded as fundamental 
aspects of citizenship, and because in recent decades the right to abortion has 
come to be regarded as a fundamental right of reproductive autonomy.178 That the 
framing generation did not regard abortion as a fundamental right is immaterial; 
this brand of originalism, we are told, is “dynamic, depending on the emerging 
customs, expectations and traditions of the American people as a whole.”179 
Balkin adds: “That we are not bound by the specific purposes of the adopters is 
especially important . . . in the case of textual commitments to unenumerated 
rights, for example, in the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”180 
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As Professor Balkin acknowledges, the claim that abortion has come to be 
regarded as a fundamental right is problematic; only four states had legalized 
abortion at the time of Roe, and Balkin concedes that it is hard to tell whether 
current support for Roe is in significant part a consequence of Roe itself rather 
than a reflection of any widespread belief about the fundamental character of the 
abortion right.181 Support for Roe seems to have stabilized at around sixty 
percent;182 it is far from clear that this is adequate to establish that abortion is 
currently regarded as a fundamental aspect of citizenship. But putting all this 
aside, it is striking how little work framing-era meaning performs in Balkin’s 
analysis. On Balkin’s account, history tells us only that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects “fundamental” rights, leaving future generations entirely 
free to decide what they regard as fundamental. Accordingly, Balkin’s claim that 
abortion should be regarded as a “privilege or immunity” of citizenship is not 
based on the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text, but instead on his 
view of contemporary thinking about the importance of the abortion right. It is 
entirely obscure how this differs from Roe’s nonoriginalist approach to abortion, 
in which the Court also concluded, without placing reliance on framing-era 
conceptions, that the Fourteenth Amendment protects “fundamental” rights and 
then proceeded to characterize abortion as involving such a fundamental right 
based on the Court’s nonoriginalist view of the importance of reproductive 
autonomy once outmoded historical conceptions about abortion are put aside.183 
As Justice Scalia once observed, once one posits the original meaning of 
constitutional text has “evolving content,” there remains “really no difference 
between the faint-hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist, except that 
the former finds it comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original 
evolutionary intent, and the latter thinks that superfluous.”184 Under Balkin’s 
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Fourteenth Amendment originalism, there is no discernable daylight between 
Balkin’s semantic originalism and nonoriginalism. Both are committed to 
protecting “fundamental” rights and equality, and, in defining these conceptions, 
the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text plays no identifiable role. One 
also has to wonder whether an interpretive methodology that places at its center 
the views of the contemporary public about what rights should be regarded as 
fundamental can legitimately be labeled originalist. One can wonder as well 
whether this methodology makes much sense; presumably the politically 
accountable branches of government should be more reliable barometers of public 
sensibilities than the judiciary. As Justice Scalia once asked: “If the Constitution 
were . . . a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would 
there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to 
the legislature?”185 
One can observe the same inability to offer an approach to constitutional 
adjudication distinct from that of nonoriginalism in the work of Professor Balkin’s 
colleague, Akhil Amar. Although Professor Amar has never presented a fully 
developed theory of originalist constitutional interpretation, he seems to be a 
semantic originalist given his interest in using historical argument to apply the 
Constitution’s text but without treating original expected applications as binding.186 
                                                                                                                 
Clause permitted federal regulation of intrastate activity that had effects in other states, and 
although acknowledging that these “spillover effects” were understood narrowly in the 
framing era, he contends that in a modern, nationalized economy it came to be understood 
that these spillover effects were far more pervasive and justified far greater federal 
regulation than was thought necessary in the framing era. See BALKIN, supra note 11, at 
143–45. This differs little from Justice Holmes’s nonoriginalist formulation: “[C]ommerce 
among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the 
course of business.” Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). In other words, 
on Balkin’s view, like that of Holmes, any nonoriginalist argument explaining that intrastate 
activity has some practical consequence for the interstate economy will fall within the 
commerce power. On this account, the original meaning of the Constitution’s text is simply 
an invitation to supply evolving content as the understanding of the interstate economic 
effects of regulated activity evolves. 
 185. Scalia, supra note 13, at 854. This concern is not unique to originalists such as 
Justice Scalia; the decidedly nonoriginalist John Ely made essentially the same point decades 
ago. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 64–69 
(1980). Balkin attempts an answer to this objection by claiming that that judicial review 
slows the process of constitutional change “until the change in constitutional culture proves 
lasting,” and therefore “channels and disciplines present-day majorities through 
supermajoritarian rules that cannot easily change overnight (but can change eventually); this 
prevents drastic changes in governance and keeps temporary majorities from altering or 
subverting the constitutional values of more temporally extended supermajorities.” BALKIN, 
supra note 11, at 326. Strikingly, Balkin describes this as one of the “features of living 
constitutionalism,” id., making it clear that he understands that one does not need 
originalism, but only a modicum of nonoriginalist prudence, to achieve such restraint. 
Beyond that, it would seem that more straightforward supermajoritarian requirements would 
be a better way of imposing restraint on transient majorities than leaving the assessment of 
current “constitutional culture” to a cloistered judiciary. 
 186. For helpful characterizations of Amar’s scholarship along these lines, see Solum, 
supra note 11, at 932; and Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and 
Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 744–45 (2000). 
1218 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1183 
 
To the extent that he qualifies as an originalist, Professor Amar is plainly not of the 
original-expected-applications variety. For example, in connection with the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure, he has written: 
“‘Reasonableness’ is not some set of specific rules, frozen in 1791 or 1868 amber, 
but an honest and sensible textual formula . . . .”187 It is difficult to imagine any 
nonoriginalist quarreling with this “formula” and for good reason—it is difficult to 
understand how it forecloses any nonoriginalist approach to the Fourth 
Amendment. Once one no longer ties “reasonableness” to framing-era practice, 
pretty much anything is fair game. 
An example helps to make the point. Professor Amar opposes the rule providing 
for the exclusion of evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment as inconsistent with the framing-era understanding that the remedy for 
an illegal search or seizure was a civil action for damages.188 Professor Lessig, in 
contrast, argues that the exclusionary rule is now justified since the common-law 
damages remedy has come to be regarded as inadequate.189 Indeed, when it 
concluded that the Constitution mandated that the states utilize the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court reasoned that experience had 
demonstrated that nonexclusionary remedies had failed to provide effective 
protection for Fourth Amendment rights.190 The question whether civil damages 
actions would provide an adequate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is a 
complex one which has spawned a rich literature.191 For present purposes, however, 
the critical point is that once one pockets Professor Amar’s concession that 
framing-era practice is not controlling, originalism is of no help in assessing the 
debate about whether the exclusionary rule is necessary to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights.192 If Professor Lessig is correct that it has become apparent that 
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REV. 363, 394–423 (1999). 
 192. Cf. George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1819, 1837 (1997) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 187) (“[I]t is not clear to me why 
inferring a civil remedy regime is a more satisfying Fourth Amendment construction than 
inferring the remedy of exclusion. The Amendment mentions neither remedy expressly. The 
historical pedigree of a civil enforcement model is admittedly better than that of the 
exclusionary rule, but civil enforcement has thorny problems that Amar ignores or 
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civil damages actions provide an inadequate remedy for constitutional violations, 
nothing in Professor Amar’s originalism warrants rejection of Professor Lessig’s 
conclusion about the exclusionary rule. Professors Amar and Lessig can resolve 
their dispute only through the same nonoriginalist method that the Supreme Court 
employed—inquiring whether, under contemporary conditions, nonexclusionary 
remedies provide a sufficiently effective means for protecting Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
Perhaps, however, the failure of Professors Amar and Balkin to develop an 
authentically originalist jurisprudence constitutes unsatisfactory evidence of a 
failure of semantic originalism. Professors Amar and Balkin have been described as 
“liberal” originalists because they advance originalist justifications for what are 
usually regarded as liberal positions.193 For that reason, they could be thought 
unlikely to embrace a brand of originalism that would use original meaning as a 
constraint on what they might regard as progressive constitutional reform. Indeed, 
as Professor Balkin describes his version of semantic originalism, it merely sets the 
boundaries for nonoriginalist argument about the proper construction of vague or 
ambiguous constitutional text, and in that fashion reconciles originalism with living 
constitutionalism.194 Thus, Balkin believes that “originalism and living 
constitutionalism . . . are actually flip sides of the same coin.”195 For this reason, 
Balkin’s approach is vulnerable to the charge that it offers only “living 
constitutionalism . . . dressed up in originalist clothing.”196 A semantic originalist 
with less concern for reaching what are regarded as liberal results might provide 
more rigorous originalist constraints for constitutional adjudication that could 
produce a genuinely originalist approach to constitutional adjudication. 
B. Libertarian Semantic Originalism  
Consider the originalism of Randy Barnett, widely regarded as a leading 
libertarian legal scholar.197 As a libertarian, Professor Barnett has perhaps more 
reason than liberals to develop a muscular originalism as a potent check on 
governmental power.  
For example, Professor Barnett argues that the original meaning of the 
Commerce Clause198 granted Congress authority to regularize or prohibit wrongful 
acts with respect to trade or exchange crossing state or national borders, but left 
                                                                                                                 
minimizes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 193. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 664; Stein, supra note 17, at 400–01 
& n.20. 
 194. See BALKIN, supra note 11, at 3–4, 22–23, 33–34, 277. 
 195. Balkin, supra note 151, at 551. 
 196. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1372 (2009). To similar effect, see, for example, Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 857, 879–81 (2009); and Smith, supra note 152, at 230–33. 
 197. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial 
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081–82 (2005) 
(reviewing BARNETT, supra note 11); Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 305 n.310. 
 198. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with Indian tribes . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. 
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Congress powerless to regulate intrastate activity such as agriculture or 
manufacturing even if it produced goods later sent into interstate commerce.199 
Even Justice Scalia has rejected this view, relying on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause200 to conclude that Congress may regulate intrastate activity when necessary 
to make regulation of interstate commerce fully effective, such as when it regulates 
the intrastate distribution of controlled substances because of the ease with which 
they can be diverted into the interstate market and the effects they can have on 
supply and demand in that market.201 Barnett, for his part, does not doubt that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause can supplement congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause, but he argues that the original meaning of the Clause requires 
that an exercise of congressional authority be more than merely convenient, though, 
he admits, not indispensable, and accordingly courts must scrutinize legislation 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to ensure that it appropriately advances a 
legitimate federal power.202 Barnett also argues that the original meaning of the 
Ninth Amendment203 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, taken together, offers general protection for individual liberty, and on 
that basis he claims that the Constitution erects a presumption of liberty that 
requires courts to insist that all legislation that restricts individual liberty be 
adequately justified.204 
Some have argued that Professor Barnett has overstated the historical evidence 
in favor of his libertarian conception of original meaning.205 Even putting this 
aside, however, what is most striking is that the mode of adjudication that Professor 
Barnett commends is anything but originalist. As a semantic originalist, Professor 
Barnett rejects framing-era practice as controlling.206 Moreover, he makes no claim 
that the historical evidence of original meaning mandates a presumption of liberty. 
As for the Ninth Amendment, Barnett claims only that its original meaning was 
that “the rights retained by the people cannot be confined to the specific liberties 
identified by originalist materials,” and, accordingly, “[w]e can protect the 
unenumerable rights retained by the people by shifting the background 
interpretive presumption of constitutionality whenever legislation restricts the 
liberties of the people” as “a way to protect the rights retained by the people 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 317–18. 
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and for–the People, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 660, 664–69 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, 
supra note 11); Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution Embody a Presumption of Liberty?, 
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 328–37 (same). 
 206. See Barnett, supra note 148, at 405–09. 
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without having to list them.”207 There is, of course, more than a little daylight 
between Barnett’s originalist claim that the Ninth Amendment contemplates 
unenumerated rights and the presumption he advocates against all government 
regulation of whatever stripe. The Ninth Amendment’s original meaning, even on 
Barnett’s view, falls short of a presumption of liberty, which is instead 
presumably offered as a nonoriginalist construction of the text, even though its 
original meaning requires no more than the recognition of some sort of 
unenumerated rights. Barnett’s nonoriginalism is even more apparent when it 
comes to the Fourteenth Amendment, where he admits that “we have no original 
meaning to apply to the problem at hand and so are thrown back upon the 
technique of constitutional construction.”208 Thus, however appealing Barnett’s 
presumption of liberty may be, it involves a nonoriginalist construction of a 
constitutional text, the original meaning of which stops well short of a presumption 
of liberty. 
As for the mechanics of Professor Barnett’s presumption of liberty, he argues 
that it requires a sufficient fit between legislative means and ends and the use of 
the least restrictive means assessed through a form of intermediate judicial 
scrutiny, though he makes no claim that this methodology was a part of the 
original meaning of any constitutional provision.209 Indeed, it is highly doubtful 
that framing-era understandings of either the Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment can 
support any very robust requirement of heightened judicial scrutiny of government 
regulation in light of the ubiquity of regulation in American history from the 
framing through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.210 For example, as 
we have seen, prohibitions on abortion were among the many regulations prevalent 
in the framing era, even though the Court found their justifications to be in 
significant part obsolete by the time of Roe v. Wade.211 Yet Professor Barnett tells 
us that he is “sympathetic” to Professor Balkin’s “conclusions about the 
unconstitutionality of [prohibiting] abortion,”212 which, as we have seen, do not rest 
on historical evidence of original meaning but rather on contemporary judgments 
about the character of abortion regulation.213  
In any event, the leeway granted for nonoriginalist adjudication under Professor 
Barnett’s presumption of liberty is enormous. Without claiming support in any 
historical evidence of original meaning, when applying the presumption of liberty, 
Barnett advocates the most common libertarian approach to regulation, regarding 
any restriction on liberty as unjustified unless the regulated activity has some 
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harmful effect on others or that is necessary to protect the rights of others.214 As 
Bernard Harcourt has observed, however, in recent years the libertarian “harm 
principle” has lost much of its bite as a variety of arguments have gained currency 
that endeavor to explain how seemingly victimless activities, such as drinking, 
prostitution, or pornography, actually do cause harm to others, or to society at 
large.215 Accepting as he does that original expected applications of constitutional 
text are not interpretively binding, Barnett’s approach does not foreclose 
acceptance of any of these nonoriginalist justifications for regulation, even though 
they could render his presumption of liberty effectively useless. Thus, Professor 
Barnett’s approach to constitutional adjudication turns not on the framing-era 
meaning of constitutional text, but rather on contemporary policy debates over the 
wisdom of regulation. Professor Barnett’s semantic originalism therefore offers 
little more originalist discipline for constitutional adjudication than that of 
Professors Amar and Balkin.216 Once again, constitutional adjudication ultimately 
turns on assessments of a variety of nonoriginalist arguments about the wisdom of 
legislation, not the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text. Nonoriginalists 
should be pleased. Indeed, pretty much giving up the game, Barnett has written that 
his account “should be acceptable even to many nonoriginalists.”217 Indeed. 
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 217. Barnett, supra note 12, at 617. 
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C. Conservative Semantic Originalism 
For a strong semantic originalism, perhaps we should look not to liberals or 
libertarians. Because of their disregard for framing-era arrangements, liberal and 
libertarian semantic originalism produce weak originalism; and, as we have seen, 
weak originalism quickly bleeds into nonoriginalism. To find a strong semantic 
originalism that offers an approach to constitutional adjudication distinct from 
nonoriginalism, perhaps it makes sense to focus on a true conservative—one who 
looks to history as a means of constraint, rather than as a vehicle for liberal or 
libertarian reform. No better candidate comes to mind than Robert Bork, “the 
leading contemporary advocate of originalist strict construction.”218 
Like Professor Barnett, Judge Bork pushes the historical evidence hard to 
produce what at first blush seems a rigorous semantic originalism, although there 
are worms in the apple. For example, Bork agrees with Barnett that the Commerce 
Clause precludes congressional regulation of intrastate activity, although he is 
strangely silent on the Necessary and Proper Clause.219 He also argues that the 
constitutional guarantee of due process is not a constraint on legislative power, but 
instead secures only fair adjudicative procedures,220 albeit without grappling with 
some significant historical evidence to the contrary on which others have relied.221 
He argues that the Ninth Amendment protects only state-law rights,222 but again 
without grappling with the considerable historical evidence to the contrary to which 
others point.223 As for the constitutional guarantee of “equal protection of the law,” 
Judge Bork argues that its original meaning was to protect only African Americans, 
or, at most, to mandate heightened judicial scrutiny of racial classifications, but 
requires no more than a rational basis for other classifications.224 Yet, given that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s text makes no reference to race, a special rule for racial 
classifications seems more like an original expected application than original 
meaning defined at the level of generality found in the text. Bork also believes that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause should go 
unenforced because he regards it as insolubly ambiguous.225 It is, of course, a 
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strange type of originalism that gives no effect to duly enacted constitutional text. 
The least likely account of the original meaning of any constitutional text is surely 
that it had no meaning at all. One has to wonder whether Bork’s assessment of this 
clause is truly originalist, or is instead based on an ideological aversion to the 
leading originalist accounts of the clause—that it was intended to secure rights 
regarded as fundamental,226 or imposed a nondiscrimination obligation with respect 
to such rights.227 In any event, even crediting this view of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, it is plainly premised not on the original meaning of anything 
actually in the Constitution, but rather on prudential concerns about the risk of error 
that inheres in originalist interpretation in the face of conflicting evidence.228 
Eventually, however, Judge Bork’s originalism collapses. As a semantic 
originalist, Bork accommodates changed circumstances and understandings; he 
defends Brown, for example, by arguing that the framing generation did not fully 
understand the implications of the equality principal that it enshrined in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.229 He defends enhanced First Amendment protection for 
the press against defamation liability beyond framing-era standards on the ground 
that subsequent experience has made plain that the press needs greater protection in 
order to play its essential role in republican government.230 As we have seen in our 
consideration of Professor Lessig’s approach, however, if historical understandings 
can be jettisoned whenever someone can argue that some relevant circumstance or 
presupposition has changed since the framing era, originalism turns into 
nonoriginalism pretty quickly. If the framing generation did not understand the full 
implications of the equality principle that it had constitutionalized when it comes to 
racial discrimination, maybe the same is true for discrimination on the basis of 
alienage, gender, or sexual orientation. After all, the original meaning of the text of 
the Equal Protection Clause, even on Bork’s account, does not confine its reach to 
racial discrimination; and even if the framing generation expected that its reach 
would be confined to racial discrimination, Bork acknowledges that the framing 
generation’s expectations about how the text would be applied are not binding. 
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The point can be generalized beyond the context of equal protection. For 
example, if Judge Bork is correct that the framing generation did not grasp the 
implications of the First Amendment’s protections for common law defamation 
liability, maybe the whole of framing-era law relating to free speech and freedom 
of the press must be jettisoned as well, once the centrality of free debate to 
republican government came to be fully understood.231 Similarly, if Judge Bork is 
correct that the framing-era understanding of the constitutional guarantee of due 
process was that it had no application to legislation, perhaps this understanding is 
itself obsolete in light of changed circumstances. The text does not state that “due 
process” is only required in adjudication, and the framing-era understanding that 
the guarantee of due process was inapplicable to legislation could be regarded as no 
more than an original expected application. After all, the concept of due process 
evolved in England, where Parliament exercised supreme authority in the absence 
of a written constitution, and could have acquired a different meaning when 
transferred to the United States Constitution, which provides that it is the supreme 
law of the land to which even statutes must conform.232 Perhaps the framing 
generation did not grasp the full implications of a written constitution for the 
concept of due process. Whether this argument persuades or not, there is nothing in 
Bork’s originalism that enables one to reject it. If, as Bork contends, the framing 
generation did not understand the full implications of the equality principle it 
adopted when it came to racial segregation, or the free speech principle it adopted 
in the First Amendment, maybe the same is true for the prohibitions on deprivation 
of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, cruel and unusual 
punishment, unreasonable search and seizure, and so on.233 
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consistent with equality—was flawed and is not binding on subsequent interpreters.” Id. at 
949 (footnote omitted). It is equally unclear how a series of original expected applications 
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Judge Bork is not the only conservative semantic originalist who encounters 
difficulty with semantic originalism’s willingness to accommodate changed 
circumstances and understandings. Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, for 
example, have argued that that congressional efforts to limit presidential control 
over the duties or removal of officials engaged in the administration or enforcement 
of the laws are unconstitutional, contending that the Constitution’s vesting of 
“executive Power” in the President,234 the President’s constitutional obligation to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”235 and the President’s 
constitutional authority to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer 
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of 
their respective Offices,”236 confers on the President unfettered authority over all 
those involved in the administration or enforcement of the law.237 Perhaps this 
textual argument persuades, but it is far from clear that if the President is able to 
remove some subordinate executive officials only for cause, then he is no longer 
vested with the “executive Power” or is unable to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.” Indeed, as then-Professor Elena Kagan demonstrated, the 
President is able to exercise quite substantial control over agencies involved in the 
administration and enforcement of the law even within a statutory framework that 
grants him less than plenary power over the officials in charge of those agencies.238 
Most scholars have found Article II no more than ambiguous on this point,239 and 
the Supreme Court has rejected the Calabresi and Prakash reading of the text.240 
Professors Calabresi and Prakash, however, are not out of bullets if their textual 
argument does not carry the day; they bolster it with an originalist argument that 
the framing-era understanding of Article II granted the President complete control 
over executive functions, which were then understood to include the process by 
which laws were administered and enforced.241 
                                                                                                                 
that are not interpretively binding and may even be later discarded altogether can 
nevertheless produce a general principle that somehow becomes interpretively binding. For 
example, on Professor Strang’s view, it seems that the general principal governing the Equal 
Protection Clause would have to accommodate racial segregation since, as we have seen, the 
permissibility of racial segregation seems to have been the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 40.  
 234. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 235. Id. § 3. 
 236. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
 237. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 11, at 559–99. 
 238. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319–46 
(2001). 
 239. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 83–93 (2009); Robert B. Percival, Presidential Management of the 
Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967–69 (2001); 
Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 611–12 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of 
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573, 597–99 (1984). 
 240. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988).  
 241. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 11, at 603–63. For a more recent restatement of 
this position, adducing additional historical evidence of framing-era practice in the wake of 
the Constitution’s ratification, see STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
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Some scholars have offered different interpretations of the historical evidence of 
the original understanding of Article II.242 But even if it is correct that, in the 
framing era, the “executive Power” was understood to include unfettered 
presidential control over all officials engaged in the administration and enforcement 
of the laws, Congress might conclude that the subsequent growth in the power of 
the presidency to a level unknown in the framing era gives rise to fears of abuse of 
executive power that could undermine the public’s confidence that the laws will be 
properly administered, that is, “faithfully executed,” unless Congress exercises its 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant some executive officials—
perhaps those exercising particularly sensitive responsibilities that might be better 
performed with some insulation from partisan political considerations—a measure 
of protection from partisan political influence. Such legislation need not be 
regarded as preventing the President from exercising “executive Power,” even in 
terms of its original semantic meaning as identified by Professors Calabresi and 
Prakash. That is because legislation limiting the influence of partisanship in law 
enforcement would still vest in the President the power to supervise all officials 
engaged in the administration or enforcement of the laws in order to ensure that 
they properly discharge those responsibilities, while adhering as well to the 
limitations imposed by such a law on the influence of partisan politics in the 
administration and enforcement of the law. Martin Flaherty has advanced an 
argument along these lines.243 
One may be unpersuaded by Professor Flaherty’s argument, but there is no basis 
in semantic originalism that enables one to reject it as a justification for departing 
from the framing-era understanding with respect to presidential power. In contrast 
to the President’s appointment power,244 Article II has no Removals Clause that 
hardwires in the text a presidential prerogative to remove at will all subordinate 
executive officials. What is hardwired in the Constitution is that the “executive 
Power”—on Professors Calabresi and Prakash’s account of original meaning, the 
power to administer and enforce the law—is vested exclusively in the President. 
Perhaps, however, some laws are best administered or enforced by officials at a 
remove from partisan warfare.  
Although the framing generation may have seen little justification for insulating 
subordinate executive officials from plenary presidential power in light of the 
                                                                                                                 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 30–122 (2008). 
 242. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics 
and Tenure Powers in the Court, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1086–93 (1988); Gerhard Casper, 
An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 211, 212–42 (1989); Driesen, supra note 239, at 96–110; Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755–1810 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Checks and 
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138–53 (1994); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 12–78 (1994); Shane, supra note 239, at 602–06, 613–17; Strauss, supra, note 239, 
at 599–608. 
 243. See Flaherty, supra note 242, at 1810–31, 1835–36; see also Martin S. Flaherty, 
Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1563, 1568–71, 1588–93 (1997). For an analogous argument focusing on the 
emergence of administrative agencies exercising much broader powers than were envisioned 
in the framing era, see Greene, supra note 242, at 153–79. 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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checks and balances created through the Constitution’s separation of legislative and 
executive powers, this assessment may have been overtaken by the growth in 
presidential power, as Professor Flaherty contends, or by the emergence of political 
parties with representatives in both the executive and legislative branches that 
undermined the efficacy of the formal separation of powers created by the 
Constitution.245 Semantic originalism, in turn, does not require that the framers’ 
expectations about the scope of presidential control over subordinate executive 
officers be treated as anything more than an “original expected application” that is 
not interpretively binding in light of changed circumstances or understandings. A 
president with the power to ensure that subordinate executive officials properly 
discharge their responsibilities on a nonpartisan basis or face dismissal for cause 
could still be vested with “the executive Power,” the original meaning of which 
Professors Calabresi and Prakash tell us was simply the power to administer and 
enforce the law.246 To be sure, there may be persuasive counterarguments 
supporting unfettered presidential authority over all executive functions,247 but they 
are not rooted in the original meaning of Article II, at least once framing-era 
practices and understandings are discarded as a basis for fleshing out vagueness 
and ambiguity in original meaning because they are no more than original expected 
applications of constitutional text. 
For his part, as a semantic originalist, Professor Calabresi agrees that original 
expected applications of constitutional text are not interpretively binding248 and 
concedes that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to alter framing-
era arrangements based on an evolving understanding of the manner in which 
federal power should be exercised.249 He also agrees that while “the Necessary and 
Proper Clause does not permit Congress to tell the President how he ought to 
implement his own constitutional powers, it does enable Congress to structure the 
administration of federal law.”250 These, however, are the key points that could lead 
a semantic originalist to reject framing-era practices regarding presidential control 
over subordinate officers as reliable indicators of original meaning. Perhaps the 
growth in the scope of executive power and partisan political influence since the 
framing era means that Congress could conclude that only officials with a measure 
of insulation from partisan politics should administer or enforce the most sensitive 
laws. If this departs from framing-era practice, semantic originalism regards such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV . L. REV. 2311, 2316–25 (2006). 
 246. See supra text accompanying note 242. 
 247. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 48–95 (1995). 
 248. See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 669–71; Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. 
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(footnote omitted). 
 249. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 666. 
 250. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 11, at 592. 
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departures as unremarkable. So it goes for pretty much all constitutional questions 
that do not have their answers hardwired into constitutional text.251 
Judge Bork, for one, grasps the potential of semantic originalism to devour itself 
and has tried to devise a solution: 
No doubt there is a spectrum along which the adjustments of doctrine to 
take account of new social, technological, and legal developments may 
gradually become so great as to amount to the creation of a new 
principle. But that observation notes a danger; it does not justify letting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. For yet another example of the inability of conservative semantic originalism to 
resolve constitutional disputes once original expected applications are cast aside, consider 
Professor Calabresi’s criticism of the decision recognizing a right of consenting adults to 
engage in homosexual sex in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). He argues that the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was to 
afford protection to fundamental rights deeply rooted in history, subject to reasonable 
exercise of the police power, and because these fundamental rights, as well as the proper 
scope of the police power, must be based on framing-era conceptions, the recognition of a 
right to homosexual sex is indefensible. See Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An 
Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1108–15 (2004). Calabresi, however, agrees 
that the framing generation’s original expected applications of constitutional text are not 
binding because “fidelity to original meaning does not require fidelity to original expected 
application,” Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 672. It is therefore entirely unclear why 
the framing generation’s view on what were thought to be deeply rooted rights and what was 
regarded as the proper scope of the police power is anything more than an original expected 
application that is not interpretively binding. In any event, it is difficult to understand why 
the right of consenting adults to engage in private heterosexual activity is not sufficiently 
rooted to qualify for protection even under Professor Calabresi’s view of original meaning; 
and since he also concedes that the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
secured equality with respect to the exercise of protected rights, it is even more unclear what 
originalist justification there could be for a prohibition on private, consensual sexual activity 
on the part homosexuals but not heterosexuals once the framing generation’s original 
expected applications are cast aside. Indeed, when he addresses the equality argument in 
support of the decision in Lawrence, Professor Calabresi makes only nonoriginalist 
arguments that invoke the extent of disagreement about whether sexual orientation 
discrimination is currently regarded as a form of invidious caste discrimination, federalism, 
and his view that the decriminalization of homosexual sex in most states is of limited 
probative value in assessing what should be regarded as a fundamental civil right. See 
Calabresi, supra at 1121–24. Similarly, presumably because he rejects reliance on original 
expected applications, when Professor Calabresi addresses Professor Balkin’s claim that a 
prohibition on abortion amounts to discrimination against women, he is forced to rely not on 
original meaning, but instead on a series of nonoriginalist arguments. See Calabresi & Fine, 
supra note 148, at 695–98. This should be unsurprising; in a subsequent article, Professor 
Calabresi argued, much like Professor Balkin, that the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment included an anti-caste principle broad enough to encompass discrimination 
against women, even though the framers did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to 
prohibit sex discrimination. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 248, at 47–60. Thus, the 
disagreement between Professors Calabresi and Balkin on abortion rests on their differing 
assessment of the strength of the nonoriginalist arguments likening laws prohibiting abortion 
to anti-caste legislation; originalism is of no help in resolving this dispute. 
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the process slide out of control. Judges and lawyers live on the slippery 
slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom. . . . 
When we say that social circumstances have changed so as to require 
the evolution of doctrine to maintain the vigor of an existing principle 
we do not mean that society’s values are perceived by the judge to have 
changed so that it would be good to have a new constitutional 
principle.252 
This admonition is little different than Professor Lessig’s notion of constraint—
changed reading of constitutional text cannot be based on the view that is 
inconsistent with the text itself.253 As we have seen, however, this view does not 
differ meaningfully from that of nonoriginalists, who also regard constitutional text 
as binding. The problem for semantic originalism is that when the text states a 
principle at a sufficient level of generality that the answer to a constitutional 
question is not found in the text itself, virtually any changed reading can be 
justified without making a claim inconsistent with the text. For example, once one 
agrees that the Equal Protection Clause enshrines a principle as broad as equality, 
and concedes that the framing generation could have been wrong about how that 
principle should be applied to racial segregation, it seems no less possible that the 
framing generation might have been wrong as well about how to apply that 
principle to women, immigrants, or gays and lesbians. Once one starts down this 
road, the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism effectively 
disappears.254 
Some conservative originalists, evidently aware that mere admonitions to judges 
not to go beyond the original meaning of constitutional text are unlikely to 
foreclose latitudinarian construction when the text is written at a high level of 
generality, supplement semantic originalism with a default rule; given the primacy 
of representative government to our constitutional structure, they argue that 
challenged legislation not clearly inconsistent with constitutional text should be 
upheld.255 This argument for deferentialism may persuade some in light of the 
Constitution’s evident solicitude for majoritarianism; although even some 
originalists might respond that given the many countermajoritarian provisions in 
the Constitution, it is far from clear that majoritarianism should be regarded as the 
overriding constitutional value.256 But whether or not a presumption of 
constitutionality rests on an attractive structural argument for deference to 
majoritarian judgments,257 it is not originalist. The advocates of this approach 
identify no evidence that a presumption of constitutionality is anchored in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. BORK, supra note 14, at 169. 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
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Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1070–82 
(1990).  
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constitutional argument. See BOBBITT, supra note 9, at 74–92. 
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original meaning of the Constitution’s text.258 The Constitution authorizes federal 
courts to hear cases “arising under this Constitution,”259 but that is as far as the text 
goes. There is no Presumption of Constitutionality Clause; nor do the advocates of 
that presumption argue that any portion of the Constitution had such an original 
meaning.260 That conservative originalists must resort to such a presumption surely 
illustrates the failure of originalism to supply a method of constitutional 
adjudication distinct from that advocated by nonoriginalists.261 
                                                                                                                 
 
 258. See Colby, supra note 23, at 770–71. 
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395–406. One need go no further than Federalist 78 to find evidence that the original 
meaning of the Constitution included a conception of judicial review as an essential part of 
the process by which governmental power was to be confined to the limits prescribed in the 
Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 393–97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2009). For illuminating reviews of historical evidence suggesting that in the wake of the 
framing, judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes was not invariably deferential, see 
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 496–97, 
517, 540–41, 560–62 (2005) and Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before 
the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1325–28 (2009). Perhaps more important, the evidence of 
deferentialism identified by Professor Hamburger is not linked to the original meaning of the 
constitutional text, and for that reason may reflect, at most, original intended applications 
rather than original meaning. Professor Calabresi, for example, despite advocating a 
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 261.  Some conservative originalists advocate a different default rule; noting that, under 
the Constitution, the federal government exercises only delegated powers while the states 
exercise plenary powers except when limited by the Constitution, they argue that the 
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exercise of state power. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 6, at 256; Lawson, supra note 11, at 1835. 
Again, this may be an attractive structural argument, but these accounts make no effort to tie 
the presumption to the original meaning of any constitutional text. At best, this default rule 
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Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses, were 
interpreted in light of framing-era practice rather than at the level of generality found in the 
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Thus, in actual practice, semantic originalism, like weak original-expected-
applications originalism, becomes nonoriginalism. Once one acknowledges that 
any relevant change since the framing era can justify a departure from the manner 
in which constitutional text was understood and applied in the framing era, for all 
questions for which the answer is not already contained in constitutional text, 
constitutional adjudication turns not on original meaning, but instead on an 
assessment of the nonoriginalist arguments for departing from framing-era practice.  
Semantic originalists concede that the framing generation may have been wrong 
about how to apply vague or ambiguous constitutional text, but this is entirely 
consistent with nonoriginalism as well. Once again, in practice, the distinction 
between originalism and nonoriginalism collapses. 
III. THE OMNIPRESENCE OF NONORIGINALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
One could argue that the thesis of this article is contradicted by its opening 
paragraphs. Although the preceding discussion may expose some inconsistencies 
among originalist judges and scholars, the reader may remain unconvinced that 
originalism has little role to play in constitutional litigation. After all, the claim that 
originalism, in practice, is unable to provide a genuinely originalist basis for 
constitutional adjudication is seemingly undermined by the decisions of recent 
years that many have identified as originalist in character.  
Although there is no statistically acceptable method for identifying a random 
and statistically significant sample of ostensibly originalist judicial decisions and 
testing them to determine if they are truly originalist in character, likely the best 
one can do is to create a sample consisting of those judicial decisions that are 
widely regarded as originalist in character. Yet, an examination of what are likely 
the three most prominent opinions of recent years to deploy an ostensibly 
originalist methodology shows that even the assertedly originalist decisions of 
recent years, on inspection, turn on nonoriginalist considerations.  
A. Crawford v. Washington 
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, 
holding that, under the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him,”262 an accused must be given an opportunity to cross-
examine anyone whose testimonial statements are offered as evidence.263 Justice 
Scalia began his opinion by conceding that “[t]he Constitution’s text does not alone 
resolve this case. One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean 
those who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or 
something in between.”264 To resolve the ambiguity, Justice Scalia examined 
framing-era practice, observing that the confrontation requirement developed in 
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out open-ended constitutional text. 
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reaction to statutes, such as those enacted in England during the reign of Queen 
Mary, which authorized the use of statements previously given to investigators to 
be used as evidence at criminal trials, whether sworn or unsworn, and on this basis 
concluded that the confrontation requirement applied even to unsworn but 
otherwise testimonial statements given to investigators.265 To so hold, the Court 
rejected the approach previously taken in Ohio v. Roberts266 and its progeny, which 
excused a lack of confrontation when an out-of-court statement was admitted under 
a firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay or otherwise possessed 
adequate indicia of reliability.267 
Because of its heavy reliance on framing-era practice, Crawford is widely 
characterized as an originalist decision,268 although some quarrel with the Court’s 
analysis of the relevant historical evidence.269 Original-expected-applications 
originalism, however, cannot explain the decision in Crawford. To be sure, in terms 
of the original expected application of the confrontation requirement, Justice 
Scalia’s opinion relies on original intended applications, noting that in the framing 
era, confrontation was accomplished through cross-examination.270 But on the 
question of whether the statements of an unsworn police interviewee could be 
considered the “witness against” the accused within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause, original intended applications were of little use. Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that the confrontation requirement was understood in the 
framing era to prohibit compelled testimony in formal examinations conducted by 
judicial officers in the fashion utilized in continental civil law rather than the use of 
unsworn statements made in police interviews.271 He nevertheless explained that 
the confrontation requirement should be extended to more informal proceedings 
unknown in the framing era:  
That interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not 
change the picture either. Justices of the peace conducting examinations 
under the Marian statutes were not magistrates as we understand that 
office today, but had an essentially investigative and prosecutorial 
function. England did not have a professional police force until the 19th 
century, so it is not surprising that other government officers performed 
the investigative functions now associated primarily with the police. 
The involvement of government officers in the production of 
testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are 
police or justices of the peace.272 
Accordingly, to explain why he went beyond framing-era practice, Justice Scalia 
invoked the now-familiar problem of changed circumstances which, as we have 
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 268. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 189–93; Scalia, supra note 8, at 871–72.  
 269. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They 
Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 270. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–56. 
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 272. Id. at 53 (citations omitted). 
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seen, so often requires originalists to retreat to some form of weak original-
expected-applications originalism or semantic originalism. Yet, as we have also 
seen, weak original-expected-applications originalism and semantic originalism are 
usually indistinguishable from nonoriginalism, and Crawford bears this out as well.  
Justice Scalia’s claim that the confrontation requirement must change with 
police practice is little different than the nonoriginalist argument for extending the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelling any person “to be a witness against 
himself”273 to police interrogation so that the Constitution can evolve in tandem 
with investigative practice.274 Yet, Justice Scalia had previously characterized the 
extension of the Fifth Amendment to “extrajudicial custodial interrogation” in 
Miranda v. Arizona275 as “a doubtful proposition as a matter both of history and 
precedent;”276 but, he made essentially the same move in Crawford, treating an 
unsworn interviewee who previously made statements to police officers but who 
does not actually testify in any official proceeding as a “witness against” an 
accused. There may be good reasons for this conclusion, but it is hardly required by 
the original meaning of the term “witness.” The only historical evidence of original 
meaning identified by the Court in Crawford was the definition of “witness” found 
in the second edition of Webster’s American Dictionary: “those who ‘bear 
testimony,’” with “‘testimony,’ in turn,” defined as “‘[a] solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”277 Whether 
a statement made to police investigators outside of the confines of a formal judicial 
investigation has the requisite solemnity, however, is a question simply not 
resolved by this definition.278 Instead, the question whether a police interviewee is a 
“witness” within the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment presents a classic 
example of textual vagueness or ambiguity requiring nonoriginalist construction. 
In truth, it is hard to see what originalism adds to the mix in Crawford. Nothing 
more than textual argument is necessary to support the holding; after all, the 
approach of Ohio v. Roberts cannot be squared with the text of the Confrontation 
Clause. The textual requirement of confrontation is absolute: it admits of no 
exception for testimony falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or that 
otherwise reflects indicia of reliability. Crawford itself makes the point quite 
nicely: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
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prescribes: confrontation.”279 Thus, the answer to the constitutional question posed 
by Crawford is hardwired into the Constitution itself—what the Sixth Amendment 
requires is not reliability but confrontation, and Roberts never claimed that the 
textual requirement of “confronting” adverse witnesses could be satisfied by the 
use of testimony from a witness the accused had never questioned. As we have 
seen, nonoriginalism no less than originalism treats constitutional text as binding. 
Inquiry into original meaning was accordingly beside the point in Crawford; the 
problem with Roberts was that its approach conflicted with the text of the 
Confrontation Clause. The only hard question in Crawford was whether to treat 
unsworn interviewees whose statements are later offered in evidence through the 
testimony of police investigators as “witnesses” subject to the confrontation 
requirement. The decision to extend the confrontation requirement to unsworn 
interviewees, however, relied on the same nonoriginalist rationale that the Court 
had earlier employed in Miranda.  
One might respond that had the Court taken a consistently originalist approach 
to the Confrontation Clause, at least it might have avoided the error of Roberts. 
Even this position, however, cannot be sustained. The text of the Confrontation 
Clause is simple; the Court’s error in Roberts was in ignoring the text. Inquiry into 
original meaning, as it turns out, may only complicate. In Crawford, it was Chief 
Justice Rehnquist who sought to preserve Roberts; he believed that the evidence 
from the framing-era was in conflict and argued that there were framing-era 
precedents suggesting that testimony accompanied by adequate indicia of reliability 
was considered admissible even if the witness had never been questioned by the 
accused.280 This, of course, is an originalist argument, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
as it happens, was an originalist.281 As Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Crawford demonstrates, once one leaves the text behind and starts digging into the 
frequently conflicting and confusing historical evidence, things can get 
complicated. Rather than enhancing textual argument in Crawford, arguments 
based on framing-era meaning were at least as likely to confuse matters. 
B. Apprendi v. New Jersey 
Another seeming win for originalism was Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the 
Court invalidated a New Jersey statute authorizing the sentencing judge to impose 
an enhanced sentence for offenses that the judge found to have been racially 
motivated.282 The Court held that any factual finding that could increase the 
authorized sentence, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a jury by virtue of the Due Process 
Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury.283 The Court invoked 
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framing-era practice to support its holding, noting that in the framing era, criminal 
cases were decided by a jury and required proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 
and in imposing these requirements, framing-era practice drew no distinction 
between the adjudication of guilt and factors bearing on the defendant’s 
sentence.284 Accordingly, the decision is usually characterized as originalist in 
character.285 Under the New Jersey statute, however, the defendant’s motive 
determined only the sentencing range rather than guilt or innocence, and, as the 
Court acknowledged, in the framing era there was no general understanding 
regarding the allocation of responsibility between judge and jury when it came to 
sentencing, since specific sentences were generally prescribed for each offense.286 
In dissent, Justice O’Connor made much of this point, arguing that in the framing 
era, there was no understanding about the manner in which facts that bore only on 
sentencing should be adjudicated.287 To this point, the Court responded by relying 
on “the principles that emerged from the Framers’ fears ‘that the jury right could be 
lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion.’”288  
Whatever the merit of the Court’s concern for erosion of the jury right, it is not 
originalist. Apprendi cannot be justified in terms of original-expected-applications 
originalism since there was no framing-era understanding with respect to the 
manner in which discretionary sentencing authority could be exercised. In the 
framing era, “overt sentencing discretion was a new development that had not yet 
taken firm shape.”289 Indeed, when it addressed the question whether the enhanced 
penalty in the federal carjacking statute for offenses that result in death or serious 
bodily injury must be proven to a jury beyond reasonable doubt in the Term before 
Apprendi, the Court admitted that “the scholarship of which we are aware does not 
show that a question exactly like this one was ever raised and resolved in the period 
before the framing.”290 To be sure, there was no framing-era precedent for 
increasing the authorized sentence based on a finding made by a judge, but the 
Court did not claim that the original meaning of the pertinent constitutional 
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provisions froze in place framing-era sentencing procedures. To the contrary, the 
Court stressed that there was no constitutional impediment to the emergence of 
sentencing discretion as a consequence of “the 19th-century shift in this country 
from statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing judges discretion 
within a permissible range . . . .”291 Thus, whatever one’s view of the Court’s 
rationale, it cannot be supported by original expected applications. Apprendi 
addressed an issue that simply did not arise in the framing era, and as we have seen, 
original-expected-applications originalism is of no aid in such cases.292 
Nor does Apprendi reflect semantic originalism. Even if the Court was correct 
that the framers feared that the jury right could be eroded by procedural innovation, 
the Court offered no criterion based on the framing-era meaning of constitutional 
text for identifying impermissible erosion. The Court acknowledged that as long as 
a judge’s finding is not the basis to increase the legally authorized sentence, judges 
may exercise “broad discretion in sentencing,”293 even though such discretion goes 
far beyond framing-era practice, and also has the potential to erode the jury right, as 
Justice O’Connor argued in dissent.294 The Court’s only response to this point was 
that “structural democratic constraints” are likely to circumscribe the extent of the 
discretion that legislatures will vest in sentencing judges.295 This argument may be 
persuasive, but it is not originalist—it is a structural argument not linked to the 
original meaning of any constitutional text. To be sure, there was no framing-era 
precedent for increasing the authorized sentence based on a judge’s finding, but as 
we have seen, semantic originalism rejects framing-era practice as the determinant 
of original meaning. Indeed, the Court’s holding permits erosion of the jury’s 
control over sentencing by allowing the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion as 
long as discretion is not tied to the sentencing judge’s factual findings. Yet, the 
Court offered no historical evidence of original semantic meaning to support its 
rule about the permissible scope of sentencing discretion, nor could it, given that 
judicial sentencing discretion had not yet developed in the framing era, and 
therefore framing-era semantic meaning reflected no understanding about the 
extent to which the emergence of judicial sentencing discretion could be reconciled 
with the Constitution’s text.296 
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Thus, there is very little about Apprendi that qualifies as originalist. This should 
be unsurprising—since guilt and punishment went hand in hand in the framing era, 
the jury’s verdict simultaneously determined both guilt and punishment; there was 
no need to develop a framing-era understanding about the role of the jury in 
sentencing because there was no distinction between the jury’s verdict and the 
resulting sentence. In an era in which guilt and punishment are not so tightly 
linked, however, original meaning supplies no reliable guide for determining what 
role the jury should have in sentencing.297 Apprendi is perhaps a classic example in 
which changed circumstances undermined reliance on framing-era practice or 
framing-era semantic meaning as a reliable guide for constitutional adjudication. 
C. District of Columbia v. Heller 
The same inability to utilize original meaning to resolve the critical issues 
pervades the ostensibly originalist decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,298 
where the Court addressed the question whether, in light of the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory admonition, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State,” the Second Amendment recognition of “the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms”299 conferred “an individual right to possess a firearm 
unconnected with service in a militia . . . .”300 The majority came down on the 
individual-rights side, characterizing this as “the original understanding of the 
Second Amendment,”301 while the dissenters concluded that the Second 
Amendment “secure[d] to the people a right to use and possess arms in connection 
with service in a well-regulated militia.”302 Heller has been described as “the most 
explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme 
Court.”303 Yet, it is hard to understand how the original meaning of the Second 
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Amendment spoke to the question before the Court. Once again, the problem of 
changed circumstances rears its ugly head. 
In the framing era, the question whether there was a right to keep and bear arms 
unconnected to service in an organized militia would have been a non sequitur. As 
the Court acknowledged, in the framing era, the militia was not a select group that 
had been conscripted into a formal military organization, but rather “the body of all 
citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons 
that they possessed at home to militia duty.”304 Thus, everyone thought capable of 
bearing arms was thought a part of the militia, and by ensuring that all those 
available to be called to militia service had a right to keep and bear arms that could 
be brought with them when called to duty, the Second Amendment was 
inextricably intertwined with militia service, even if it facilitated individual self-
defense and other individual uses of arms as well. The Court, in other words, 
endeavored to use original meaning in order to address a question that never arose 
in the framing era. For that reason, reliance on original expected applications was a 
dead end. 
Thus, Heller seems to reflect semantic originalism more than any original 
expected application of the Second Amendment. Indeed, in the vein of semantic 
originalism, when it addressed the District’s reliance on the Second Amendment’s 
preamble reflecting a limitation on Second Amendment rights to possession and 
use of arms in relation to service in an organized militia, the Court did not invoke 
framing-era practice, but instead reasoned that “[l]ogic demands that there be a link 
between the stated purpose and the command,” adding that the “requirement of 
logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the 
operative clause,” but beyond that, “a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the 
scope of the operative clause.”305 As for the operative clause, the Court defined the 
right to “keep” arms as the right to “have” or possess them,306 and the right to 
“bear” arms as the right to “carry[] for a particular purpose—confrontation,”307 and 
then, finding no ambiguity, concluded that the preamble did not limit the scope of 
the operative right but merely “announces the purpose for which the right was 
codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.”308 Yet, the Court made no claim that 
its view of the logical relation between preamble and operative clause was familiar 
to the framing-era public, despite its admonition that “[n]ormal meaning may of 
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings 
that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”309 
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Given that the framing-era public never had occasion to consider whether the right 
to bear arms could be separated from militia service, the Court could not have made 
such a claim. Perhaps as a matter of ordinary semantic meaning, the Court’s view 
about the relation between a preamble and an operative clause is sound, but this is a 
purely textual argument not based on historical evidence of original meaning.310 
But put all this aside and assume that Heller’s handling of the preamble is 
defensible on originalist grounds despite the ahistorical character of the question 
whether the right to keep and bear arms could be separated from militia service. 
Even so, originalism offers no defense for the Court’s decision to invalidate the 
District’s handgun ban. After all, the District argued that it had not infringed the 
right to keep and bear arms because it permitted its residents to possess some types 
of “arms,” such as long guns, even though it had banned handguns.311 To this, the 
Court had neither a textual nor an originalist response—perhaps because the 
District had indeed identified an ambiguity in the Second Amendment. Instead, the 
Court wrote that “[t]he handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 
‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful 
purpose,” and that the ban “extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”312 The Court added that “[f]ew 
laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the 
District’s handgun ban. And some of those few have been struck down.”313 
Handguns, the Court wrote, are considered “the quintessential self-defense 
weapon.”314 Rejecting Justice Breyer’s proposed balancing test, the Court added: 
“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has 
been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”315 Nevertheless, 
despite having defined the original meaning of the right to “keep” arms as the right 
to “have” them and the right to “bear” arms as the right to “carry” them “in case of 
confrontation,”316 the Court characterized as “presumptively lawful”317 a number of 
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laws circumscribing the ability to possess or carry firearms, including “prohibitions 
on carrying concealed weapons” and “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”318  
Commentators puzzling over this portion of the opinion have suggested that the 
Court adopted a categorical approach in which “core” Second Amendment interests 
receive something close to absolute protection while more peripheral interests are 
subject to greater regulation.319 What is striking about this core-and-penumbra 
approach, however, is that nothing about it is originalist. As for original expected 
applications, the Court claimed no historical support for a core-and-penumbra 
approach; what is more, the regulations that the Court identified as presumptively 
lawful have little or no framing-era support. Prohibitions on carrying concealed 
weapons, for example, did not emerge in the United States until the 1810s and 
1820s, in response to a surge in violent crime.320 Laws prohibiting the possession of 
firearms by convicted felons became widespread only in the twentieth century, in 
response to a crime wave following the First World War.321 The Court even 
acknowledged that there was little framing-era regulation aside from laws 
addressing gunpowder storage and the discharge of firearms.322 Unsurprisingly, a 
number of originalists have objected to this portion of this opinion because of its 
lack of framing-era support,323 and nonoriginalists have chided the Court for 
inconsistency.324 
As for semantic originalism, as we have seen, it usually offers little meaningful 
difference from nonoriginalism, and Heller again proves the point. As we have 
seen, the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text played no role in the 
Court’s ahistorical core-and-penumbra approach. The Court was forced to utilize a 
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nonoriginalist approach because of the ambiguity of the constitutional text on 
whether the right to keep and bear arms protects the possession and carrying of 
every type of arms or only requires that the people can possess and carry some type 
of arms. Given this ambiguity, resort to nonoriginalism was inescapable; even 
originalists concede that textual vagueness or ambiguity requires nonoriginalist 
construction.325 The Court’s core-and-penumbra approach may be preferable to 
Justice Breyer’s balancing if one accepts the Court’s view that rights receive too 
uncertain protection under balancing tests,326 but that view is no more based on the 
historically fixed meaning of constitutional text than the interest balancing of 
Justice Breyer.  
D. The (Limited) Place for Originalism in Practice 
Accordingly, when it comes to cases of textual vagueness or ambiguity, where 
nonoriginalists claim license for their brand of constitutional adjudication, in actual 
practice, neither original expected applications nor semantic originalism are of 
much use. Instead, in the face of textual vagueness or ambiguity—precisely what 
gives rise to constitutional litigation in actual practice—nonoriginalism is where 
the action is.  
This is not to suggest that original meaning plays no role in constitutional 
adjudication. As we have seen, some constitutional provisions, such as the Seventh 
Amendment, amount to textual commands to assess constitutional meaning by 
reference to framing-era practice.327 Thus, Seventh Amendment adjudication 
centers on framing-era practice, even though the Court is often forced to engage in 
rough analogies when assessing whether the right to a jury trial applies to actions 
unknown at common law.328 An originalist inquiry may be hard wired into the text 
in other ways; for example, when the Constitution uses a framing-era term of art, 
such as its prohibitions on “ex post facto Law[s],”329 interpretation necessarily 
begins with the framing-era meaning of that term.330 And, sometimes, a 
semantically plausible reading of the text can be ruled out by reference to its 
original meaning; to appropriate John Ely’s example, some of the Constitution’s 
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“provisions, such as the one requiring that the President be a ‘natural born Citizen,’ 
may need a reference to historical usage so as to exclude certain alternative 
constructions–conceivably if improbably here, a requirement of legitimacy (or 
illegitimacy!) or non-Caesarian birth.”331 
These, however, are the rare cases. The Seventh Amendment’s textual reference 
to framing-era common law appears nowhere else in the Constitution. While there 
are a few framing-era terms of art in the Constitution, most of it remains accessible 
to the contemporary reader, and the meaning of its terms has, for the most part, 
changed little, if at all, since the framing era. Framing-era semantic meaning can 
occasionally resolve ambiguities; but the fact that the Constitution uses words the 
meaning of which are largely unchanged since the framing makes these problems 
rare; no one, for example, really needs to study history to know that the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause does not mean that only the legitimate or non-Caesarian born 
are eligible to serve as President.332 
Originalism is unnecessary when a constitutional debate can be resolved by the 
text itself; originalism is of aid in constitutional adjudication if it can utilize 
original meaning to resolve textual vagueness or ambiguity. As we have seen, 
however, original-expected-applications originalism as a means of addressing 
textual vagueness or ambiguity is fraught with peril; even the framing generation 
may not have intended that its own understandings and practices be applied to 
radically altered circumstances. Semantic originalism is no more successful. For 
highly specific constitutional texts, original semantic meaning is sufficiently 
constraining, but as we have seen, textualism is no less likely to provide constraint 
in such cases. When the text is written at a high level of generality, in contrast, the 
original semantic meaning becomes so expansive that it cannot be distinguished 
from nonoriginalism. Semantic originalists, to be sure, commence constitutional 
adjudication with ritual incantations of original meaning, but at the end of the day, 
decidedly nonoriginalist conceptions of liberty, equality, or other nonoriginalist 
considerations do the analytical heavy lifting.  
To be sure, history can be of aid to constitutional law. Just as Holmes famously 
denounced slavish adherence to historical practice, he also wrote, famously as well, 
that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”333 Indeed. In McDonald v. City 
of Chicago,334 for example, a four-justice plurality, as it considered whether the 
Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is protected against the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, did not tether its inquiry to the 
original meaning of the Clause but instead employed a nonoriginalist test asking 
whether the Second Amendment was sufficiently “fundamental from an American 
perspective” to merit incorporation within the Fourteenth335—yet it nevertheless 
consulted history in an effort to determine whether Second Amendment rights had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 331. ELY, supra note 185, at 13. 
 332. There are, however, some close cases involving the Natural Born Citizen Clause in 
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gained widespread acceptance in national history.336 In this sense, historical 
inquiry, though not conclusive, can provide valuable rigor to adjudication.337 
Consulting history as a guide, however, stops far short of originalism’s insistence 
that historically fixed meanings of constitutional text control constitutional 
adjudication. 
As the survey of recent ostensibly originalist decisions above makes plain, 
authentically originalist adjudication is something like the Loch Ness Monster—
much discussed, but rarely encountered. In constitutional adjudication, 
nonoriginalism is where the action is. 
 
* * * 
 
Some years ago, my onetime teacher, Laurence Tribe, in the course of noting 
Ronald Dworkin’s claimed conversion to originalism, wrote, “[w]e are all 
originalists now,”338 a seeming concession that evoked more than a little 
comment.339 Perhaps Professor Tribe got it backwards. 
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